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NOTES
THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK: NATIONAL
LAWS THAT BEST PROTECT INDIGENOUS
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL REDD REGIME
Stephanie Baez*
This Note focuses on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD), an international framework that aims to curb carbon
emissions by reducing deforestation. While international negotiators
discuss the environmental benefits of REDD, which will likely be
implemented in the Kyoto Protocol’s post-2012 commitment period, forestdwelling indigenous communities worry that REDD will destroy their
livelihoods. Countries with high deforestation rates, such as Brazil and
Indonesia, have already implemented a number of voluntary REDD pilot
projects and are currently creating legal frameworks to address the
complexities of REDD. This Note compares the legal frameworks of Brazil
and Indonesia in terms of how well they protect indigenous rights.
Ultimately, the lives of indigenous peoples will be most affected by national
laws that govern the implementation of REDD. Accordingly, this Note
provides suggestions on how to build a legal framework that capitalizes on
the environmental and economic benefits of REDD while protecting the
rights and livelihood of indigenous peoples.
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INTRODUCTION
When the roof over his home in Amazonas, Brazil, sprung a leak,
Antonio Alves ventured into the 1.57 million square kilometers1 of forest
around him to gather wood. 2 Instead of finding material to fix the leak,
Alves found the Green Police, 3 a group of local law enforcement officials
hired by General Motors, American Electric Power, and Chevron.4
Together these corporations spent $18 million to purchase the carbon
dioxide sequestered inside 202 square kilometers of the Amazon forest.5
Hoping forest conservation will allow them to offset their own emissions
and make money on the carbon market, the companies created forest
reserves and hired the Green Police to protect their investments. “[I]f
you’re not clear-cutting forest, just cutting three or four trees to build a
house, I don’t think it’s a crime,” said Alves, who ended up with a gun to
his neck as he tried to cut one tree.6 “They think it is.” 7 After spending
eleven days in jail, Alves eventually moved to avoid further harassment by
the Green Police. 8
Alves is not alone. As science and economics convince international
policymakers that forest protection will play a crucial role in the reduction
of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 9 indigenous peoples across the
globe are being bound by land-use restrictions in forests they have
1. See Virgilio M. Viana, Seeing REDD in the Amazon: A Win for People, Trees and
Climate, INT’L INST. FOR ENV’T AND DEV., Mar. 2009, at 1.
2. See Transcript, Frontline World: The Carbon Hunters, PBS, available at
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/carbonwatch/2009/05/the-carbon-hunterstranscript-credits.html (transcript of PBS television broadcast of May 11, 2010).
3. Id.; see also Conservation Projects Displace Locals, MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN
PUBLIC MEDIA (Feb. 26, 2010), http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2010/02/26/
pm-brazil-two/ (noting that while the “Green Police,” or Força Verde, are hired to ensure
that land developers and poachers do not cut down trees or otherwise destroy the ecosystem,
forest-dwelling people protest that they are unfairly prevented from using forest resources).
4. See Mark Schapiro, GM’s Money Trees, MOTHER JONES, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 61–62.
5. See id. (noting that the companies purchased 50,000 acres, which is equivalent to
202 square kilometers).
6. Transcript, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The world currently emits forty gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2) each year, causing
the atmosphere to contain 425 parts per million (ppm) of GHGs. In order to avoid dangerous
levels of CO2, many scientists recommend that the atmospheric concentration of GHGs be
stabilized at 450 ppm. To achieve this, global CO2 emissions should be reduced to five
gigatons per year. See generally Climate Change 2007:
Synthesis Report,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/
assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf [hereinafter Climate Change 2007] (suggesting that if
major climate catastrophes are to be avoided, CO2 emissions should peak within the next ten
to twenty years, and then begin to decline); Climate Change “Can Be Tackled,” BBC (May
4, 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/6620909.stm (noting that CO2
stabilization at 450 ppm would prevent the world’s average temperature from increasing
more than two degrees Celsius, which would be a dangerous temperature rise). The most
cost-effective way to curb emissions is through avoided deforestation projects, such as
REDD. For elaboration on the economic impact of avoided deforestation, see JOHN
ELIASCH, CLIMATE CHANGE: FINANCING GLOBAL FORESTS: THE ELIASCH REVIEW (2008) and
NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW (2007).
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traditionally considered home. 10 The most developed method of forest
conservation is Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD), which allows governments and private companies to
offset their own carbon emissions by paying to keep forests standing, and,
in effect, purchasing the carbon that is stored inside.11
While the forest carbon market is growing exponentially, many
indigenous groups fear that they will not see the benefits of REDD, and
may actually be harmed, by it.12 For the indigenous, trees do much more
than store carbon; they provide food, shelter, and livelihood.13
Deforestation can also be an essential part of indigenous income, as
agricultural expansion, logging activities, and infrastructure creation all
contribute to the economic well-being of forest-dwelling peoples.14
Although REDD has positive environmental goals, indigenous groups are
concerned that these goals will be achieved at the expense of their
livelihood, while allowing developed nations to continue “business as
usual.” 15 In order to ensure that indigenous peoples can co-exist with
REDD, avoided deforestation programs must protect indigenous rights to
self-determination, informed consent, and property. 16
This Note focuses on the impact that national legal frameworks will have
on rights protection in a global REDD regime. Regardless of international
REDD agreements, the lives of indigenous peoples will be most directly
influenced by the national laws that regulate forest governance. 17 After
explaining the background of REDD and indigenous rights in Part I, this
Note compares the legal frameworks of two countries with the world’s
highest deforestation rates—Brazil and Indonesia—in terms of how their
10. See Nicholas Anderson, REDDy or Not? The Effects on Indigenous Peoples in
Brazil of a Global Mechanism for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation,
2 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 18 (2009) (detailing how REDD has prevented indigenous peoples
from using forests for traditional practices). See generally Tom Griffiths, Seeing ‘REDD’?
Forests, Climate Change Mitigation and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local
Communities,
FOREST
PEOPLES
PROGRAMME
(May
2009),
http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/doc_923.pdf (explaining how REDD
programs preclude indigenous peoples from using forests for economic purposes).
11. See John Vidal, Q&A: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest
Degradation (REDD), GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.guardian.co.uk/
environment/2009/sep/24/redd-reducing-emissions-from-deforestation.
12. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (noting that indigenous groups have not been
able to participate in the decision-making stages of REDD).
13. See Viana, supra note 1.
14. See id.; see also Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., Reducing Forest Emissions in the
Amazon Basin: A Review of Drivers of Land-Use Change and How Payments for
Environmental Services (PES) Schemes Can Affect Them 7–9 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry
Research, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications/
pdf_files/WPapers/WP40Wertz-Kanounnikoff.pdf.
15. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 21.
16. See, e.g., Kathleen Lawlor & David Huberman, Reduced Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) and Human Rights, in RIGHTS BASED
APPROACHES: EXPLORING ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSERVATION 269, 281–82
(Jessica Campese et al. eds., 2009).
17. See Alejandro Iza, Foreword to JOHN COSTENBADER, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
REDD: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL ix, ix (John Costenbader ed.,
2009) (noting that national legal clarity is essential to a successful REDD program).
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national REDD regulations affect indigenous populations. Part III then
argues that a national legal framework which clearly defines forest
governance—including carbon property rights, REDD financing, and
benefits distribution—should be implemented in any country that adopts
REDD programs. Lastly, this Note closes by making recommendations for
a legal framework that best protects indigenous rights to property, informed
consent, and self-determination.
I. REDDY OR NOT: REDD’S SUDDEN PROMINENCE AND HOW IT IMPACTS
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
In November of 2009, one week before the 15th Conference of the
Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(COP-15) gathered in Copenhagen to discuss the future of the Kyoto
Protocol, 18 the summit was hailed as “the most important [international
meeting] since World War II.” 19 COP-15 was expected to yield an
international agreement on the successor to the Kyoto Protocol, which will
expire in 2012. 20 Ratified by 193 parties, 21 the Kyoto Protocol sets
mandatory limits on the production of six greenhouse gases, and
demonstrates the “near universal recognition of the seriousness of . . .
climate change . . . for the future of the world.” 22 COP-15 is generally
regarded as a failure because the parties did not agree on binding
commitments for the reduction of GHG levels in the post-2012 commitment
18. The Conference of the Parties (COP) is a yearly gathering of the Parties to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the primary
international agreement to mitigate climate change. See U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, art. 7, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. The UNFCCC is a framework
treaty that is meant to be adapted over time in light of new information. During each annual
COP summit, international negotiators discuss potential amendments. See, e.g., Convention
Bodies, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.php (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
19. Lara Lázaro, Climate Change Talks: Breakdown in Copenhagen: Next Stop,
Mexico 2010 (COP 16), ELCANO ROYAL INSTITUTE (Sept. 3, 2010),
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?size320=50&ots591=
0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=122367.
20. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol began on January 1, 2008 and
will end on December 31, 2012. See Daniel Bodansky, W[h]ither the Kyoto Protocol?
Durban and Beyond, HARVARD PROJECT ON CLIMATE AGREEMENTS, 1 (Aug. 2011),
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Bodansky_Viewpoint-Final.pdf. For a subsequent
commitment period to begin on January 1, 2013, amendments to the Protocol must enter into
force on or before that date. See 3rd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto, Japan, Dec. 1–10, 1997, Kyoto Protocol
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ¶ 3.7, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/CP/1997/7, Dec. 10, 1997 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
21. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/
items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
22. Richard L. Ottinger, Introduction: Copenhagen Climate Change Conference—
Success or Failure?, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 411, 412–13 (2010); see also Kyoto Protocol,
supra note 20, ¶ 3.1 (establishing a framework for developed nations to “reduc[e] their
overall emissions of [greenhouse] gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the
commitment period 2008 to 2012”).
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period. 23 They did, however, agree that emissions reduction credits for
avoided deforestation (REDD) projects will be included in the post-Kyoto
protocol. 24 Although the Copenhagen Accord is neither binding nor
specific, it shifted the debate from if to how REDD will be implemented. 25
This Part provides background on REDD, focusing on its environmental
and social impacts. It first explores the environmental benefits of forest
protection, and then traces the history of REDD in international agreements.
Part I.C. highlights the numerous policy uncertainties that still exist in
REDD implementation, and finally, Part I.D. analyzes REDD and
indigenous rights, looking at the potential risks and rewards REDD could
bestow upon indigenous communities.
A. The Role of Forests in Curbing Climate Change
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC), climate change occurs when the composition of the
global atmosphere is altered, either directly or indirectly, by human
activity. 26 Power generation, deforestation, transportation, and agriculture
all produce greenhouse gases—such as carbon dioxide—that cause
temperatures to rise across the globe. 27 Because climate change is
“intricately intertwined with . . . population growth, desertification and land
degradation, air and water pollution [and] loss of biodiversity,” it has been
identified as an international crisis.28
The consequences of climate change are especially severe for indigenous
peoples, who are among the poorest and most marginalized in the world,
and often also live in areas most affected by rising temperature. 29 Because
their livelihoods frequently depend upon land use and natural resources,

23. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A
Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 230, 240 (2010).
24. See 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7–18, 2009, Copenhagen Accord, ¶ 6 U.N. DOC.
FCCC/CP/2009/L.7 (Dec. 18. 2009) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord] (“We recognize the
crucial role of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to
enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide
positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism
including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed
countries.”).
25. Ottinger, supra note 22, at 417 (noting that “[o]ne of the most important
accomplishments” of COP-15 was an agreement on the architecture and funding of REDD).
26. Climate Change Glossary, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/text/html/list_search.php?what=keywords
&val=&valan=a&anf=0&id=10 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
27. See, e.g., LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (2008).
28. Charlotte Streck et al., Climate Change and Forestry: An Introduction, in CLIMATE
CHANGE AND FORESTS: EMERGING POLICY AND MARKET OPPORTUNITIES 3, 3 (Charlotte
Streck ed., 2008).
29. See Annelie Fincke, Indigenous Peoples and REDD-plus: Challenges and
Opportunities for the Engagement of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities in REDDplus, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, 2 (June 2010),
http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/iucn_briefing_ips_and_redd_aug_2010_summary.pdf.
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indigenous groups are at great risk as climate change depletes resources and
pushes them from their traditional homes. 30
To combat climate change, the international community has principally
focused on reducing the amount of carbon dioxide that is released into the
atmosphere by industrial and energy sectors. 31 The focus is now shifting to
the reduction of forest carbon emissions,32 however, as it is recognized that
The
deforestation is a major contributor to climate change. 33
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a United Nations body
containing over 2,000 scientists who analyze evidence on climate change,
estimates that the forestry sector is responsible for 17.4 percent of global
GHG emissions, placing it above the transportation and industry sectors,
which account for 14 percent of global emissions each. 34
Forests are the world’s most important terrestrial carbon “sink,” or
storehouse of carbon. 35 The Earth’s carbon naturally cycles through four
main sinks: geological, oceanic, terrestrial, and atmospheric.36 One “goal
of climate change initiatives” is to “reduce the amount of carbon in the
atmospheric store and increase the amount that is sequestered in one of the
other three reservoirs.” 37 Forests remove carbon from the atmosphere and
sequester it in their biomass and soils, which contain approximately 60
percent of the carbon that is stored in terrestrial sinks. 38
When a forest is destroyed (for example, cut down for timber or burned),
the harmful effects are twofold: not only is the carbon sequestered in each
tree released into the atmosphere, but also the remaining forest’s capacity to
absorb carbon from the atmosphere is diminished. 39 As a result,
deforestation, which is the “permanent removal of forest cover,” contributes
significantly to global carbon dioxide emissions.40 In fact, in “2002 [the]
rate of forest loss in Brazil and Indonesia alone . . . produced four-fifths as
30. See id.
31. See Streck et al., supra note 28, at 3–4.
32. See id. at 4.
33. Seeing the Wood: Special Report: Forests, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2010, at 3–6.
34. See Climate Change 2007, supra note 9; see also Daniel Howden, Deforestation:
The
Hidden
Cause
of
Global
Warming,
INDEP.
(May
2007)
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/deforestation-the-hidden-causeof-global-warming-448734.html (noting that in a 24-hour period, deforestation emits the
same amount of carbon as 8 million people flying from New York to London).
35. Dennis D. Hirsch, Trading in Ecosystem Services: Carbon Sinks and the Clean
Development Mechanism, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 623, 628 (2007) (defining a carbon
sink as “a process, activity, or mechanism that removes GHG . . . from the atmosphere and
then stores them”).
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Jiarui Dong et al., Remote Sensing Estimates of Boreal and Temperate Forest Woody
Biomass: Carbon Pools, Sources, and Sinks, 84 REMOTE SENSING OF ENV’T 393, 393
(2003).
39. See generally G. Bala et al., Combined Climate and Carbon-Cycle Effects of LargeScale Deforestation, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 6550 (2007).
40. Ross Andrew Clarke, Moving the REDD Debate from Theory to Practice: Lessons
Learned from the ULU Masen Project, 6 LAW ENV’T & DEV. J. 36, 39 (2010) (explaining the
harmful effects of forest degradation, as well as deforestation, and defining “forest
degradation” as “gradual changes that negatively affect forest production capacity”).
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many greenhouse gases as the Annex I [developed] 41 countries committed
to reduce that year under the Kyoto Protocol.” 42
Because forests are immense carbon sinks, many scientists and
policymakers alike agree that they should play an important role in curbing
climate change.43 REDD is the best-developed international proposal for
forest conservation. Part I.B. traces the history of REDD, which is
expected to be a legally binding part of the post-2012 successor to the
Kyoto Protocol. Currently, REDD exists solely as a series of pilot projects
that are guided by non-binding international agreements. Beginning with
the Kyoto Protocol, Part I.B. discusses the inclusion—or exclusion—of
REDD in international climate change legislation and explains how REDD
proposals have changed over time, ending with the projection of a legally
binding global REDD regime.
B. The Road to REDD
Despite the recognized link between deforestation and climate change,
avoided deforestation projects were excluded from the Kyoto Protocol’s
2008–12 commitment period, in large part because of practical concerns.44
Due to the difficulties of monitoring and verifying carbon emissions that are
reduced from avoided deforestation, negotiators decided to limit the
inclusion of forestry projects in the Kyoto Protocol to afforestation—the
planting of trees on land that was not previously forested —and
reforestation, which refers to recently cleared forestland. 45
Avoided deforestation became a key part of international discussions in
2005, when the Coalition of Rainforest Nations (CfRN), led by Costa Rica
and Papua New Guinea, proposed “RED” at COP-11 in Montreal.46

41. According to the UNFCCC, Annex I nations “include the industrialized countries
that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties),
including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern
European States.” Parties and Observers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Oct.
20, 2011). Annex I nations are the only countries bound by mandatory carbon emission
reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Id.
42. Michael L. Brown, Note, Limiting Corrupt Incentives in a Global REDD Regime, 37
ECOLOGY L.Q. 237, 239 (2010); see also David Takacs, Carbon into Gold: Forest Carbon
Offsets, Climate Change Adaptation, and International Law, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y 39, 56 (2009).
43. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
44. See Frances Seymour, Forests, Climate Change, and Human Rights: Managing Risk
and Trade-offs, CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RESEARCH, 6 (Oct. 2008), http://www.cbd.int/
doc/meetings/tk/redd-ilc-01/other/redd-ilc-01-cifor-en.pdf; see also David Freestone,
Foreword, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORESTS, supra note 28, at ix, x (noting that avoided
deforestation was kept out of international climate change discussions for political and
methodological reasons, including disagreements among Annex I nations and difficulties
with emissions leakage and additionality).
45. See ROSS W. GORTE & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34560,
FOREST CARBON MARKETS: POTENTIAL AND DRAWBACKS 3 (2008).
46. 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 9, 2005, Reducing Emissions from
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Focusing solely on deforestation (not forest degradation, hence only one
“D”) the CfRN called on UNFCCC parties to “take note of present rates of
deforestation within developing nations, acknowledge the resulting carbon
emissions, and consequently open dialogue to develop scientific, technical,
policy and capacity responses to address such emissions resulting from
tropical deforestation.” 47 The COP-11 parties agreed to submit CfRN’s
RED proposal to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice
(SBSTA) for a further study on deforestation, to be reviewed at COP-12. 48
Avoided deforestation programs gained further support following the
release of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change in 2007. 49
The “most comprehensive synthesis of data concerning the economic
impacts of climate change,” the Stern Review identifies avoided
deforestation as the cheapest option for mitigating emissions of greenhouse
gases. 50 In light of the environmental and economic evidence produced by
the CfRN proposal and Stern Review findings, RED moved to the forefront
of international climate change discussions.
At COP-13 in Bali, the UNFCCC parties agreed upon the “Bali
Roadmap,” a timeline for the development of an international REDD
proposal. 51 The forward-looking Roadmap was designed to create climate
change legislation beyond the Kyoto Protocol, emphasizing the importance
of “long-term cooperative action” within the international community.52
The Bali Roadmap targeted COP-15 (the 2009 summit in Copenhagen) as
the deadline for an agreement on a comprehensive post-Kyoto plan.53
Additionally, the parties identified forest degradation as a major source of
emissions that should be discussed in conjunction with deforestation, and
specifically identified an “urgent need” to take further action with REDD
implementation. 54

Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/CP/2005/L.2 (2005) [hereinafter RED Proposal].
47. Id. at Submission by the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, at 2.
48. See Convention Bodies, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/convention_bodies/items/2629.
php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (explaining that the SBSTA follows a specific mandate to
give advice to the COP on land-use issues).
49. See generally STERN, supra note 9 (arguing that it is more cost-effective for
developed nations to reduce carbon emissions via offsets from REDD projects than to
convert their fossil-fuel-dependent economies and reduce emissions domestically).
50. Daniel Watts, Capping Deforestation Emissions in Developing Countries Equitably
and Effectively, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 819, 822 (2010).
51. See 13th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on
its Thirteenth Session, U.N. DOC FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter Bali
Roadmap].
52. Id. ¶ 1.
53. See Chris Spence et al., Great Expectations: Understanding Bali and the Climate
Change Negotiations Process, 17 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 142, 151
(2008).
54. Bali Roadmap, supra note 51, ¶ 1(b)(iii) (deciding that, by COP-15, the international
community should develop “[p]olicy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and
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Although the Bali Roadmap led to Copenhagen, COP-15 was ultimately
not as successful as most had hoped.55 Instead of developing the successor
to the Kyoto Protocol, COP-15 yielded the Copenhagen Accord, a “nonbinding political statement outlining principles to keep global warming to 2
degrees Celsius.” 56 In terms of REDD, the Copenhagen Accord recognizes
the importance of including REDD in future legislation, calls for the
“immediate establishment” of a mechanism to mobilize resources for
REDD, and emphasizes the “need to provide positive incentives” to
encourage REDD support. 57 The Copenhagen Accord loosely outlines a
framework for “REDD-Plus”—an expanded version of REDD that would
include the maintenance of forest carbon stocks as well as avoided
deforestation and degradation—but does not provide concrete guidance for
REDD plans. 58 Despite the vague language of the Copenhagen Accord, it
ensures REDD’s place in future climate change legislation.
Following the disappointment of the Copenhagen summit, international
negotiators did not have high expectations going into Cancun’s COP-16,
held in December 2010.59 Worse than reaching an impasse regarding the
details of a climate change plan, the parties were unable to agree on whether
the Kyoto Protocol should have a second commitment period at all.60 After
two weeks of negotiations, the parties agreed upon the Cancun Accord, 61 a

the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest
carbon stocks in developing countries”).
55. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
56. Florence Daviet, From Copenhagen to Cancun: Forests and REDD+, WORLD
RESEARCH INST. (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/11/copenhagen-cancunforests-and-redd; see also Bodansky, supra note 23, at 231 (noting that objections by a small
group of countries—led by Sudan, Venezuela and Bolivia—prevented the Copenhagen
Conference from officially “adopting” the Accord and instead caused the Conference to take
“note of” the Copenhagen Accord, leaving its future status uncertain).
57. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 6.
58. Tom Griffiths notes that the change from REDD to REDD+ occurred in March
2009, and “has since been used as the official definition of REDD in the negotiating text for
an agreement in Copenhagen that includes Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) and
enhancement of forest carbon stocks, notably reforestation, afforestation and plantations.”
Griffiths, supra note 10, at 5. For purposes of clarity, this Note uses REDD as a synonym
for REDD+.
59. See The United Nations Climate Conference in Cancun, COP-16, UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_16/items/
5571.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also Lisa Friedman, Sandy, White Beaches and a
‘Toxic’ Issue Confront Negotiators as Cancun Talks Begin, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/11/29/29climatewire-sandy-white-beaches-and-a-toxicissue-confro-40061.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the future of the Kyoto Protocol was
uncertain before the Cancun Summit, with many policymakers expecting negotiation
breakdowns and mass walk-outs instead of an agreement); Gregory Hudson, Cancun: Will
COP 16 Live Up to Low Expectations?, TRADE & ENV’T REV., Dec. 2010, at 2–16
(explaining that, after the Copenhagen Summit failed to yield a binding agreement,
commentators believed that a comprehensive emissions reductions agreement at Cancun was
not possible).
60. See Alister Doyle, Kyoto Impasse Still Blocks U.N. Climate Talks: India, REUTERS
(Dec. 9, 2010, 4:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6B83ZP20101209.
61. 16th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29–Dec. 10, 2010, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc
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“brilliant” compromise that allowed each nation to get its way in some
area 62—except Bolivia, who adamantly objected to the entire
agreement 63—and avoided the question of a Kyoto successor altogether.64
Although the Cancun Accord will be fully adopted, it leaves open the
question of whether its measures will be legally binding. 65
Despite the disagreements surrounding the Cancun Accord, the COP-16
parties reached a consensus on REDD. 66 Regardless of whether there is a
post-Kyoto agreement, the international community is committed to
creating REDD legislation.67 Building upon the REDD text that has been
discussed in previous COP summits, the Cancun Accord added guidance on
REDD-capacity-building measures to ensure that developing countries are
able to implement REDD effectively. 68 The Accord advocates a phased
approach, with three readiness phases: planning, implementation, and
results-based activities. 69 To undertake REDD activities, each country
must develop a national REDD plan, a national reference emission level, a
national forest monitoring system, and a system to address safeguards for
indigenous peoples’ rights. 70
Despite the agreement in Cancun, the international REDD text still leaves
a number of unanswered questions. Key policy uncertainties include the
definition of “forest,” the scope and scale of REDD activities, and REDD

Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention, U.N. DOC.
FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/L.7 (2010) [hereinafter Cancun Accord].
62. The Cancun Accord helped close the gap between rich and poor nations, for
example, by developing the Green Climate Fund to raise $100 billion to assist poor nations
with carbon emissions reductions (something that pleases poor nations), and mandating that
the fund be controlled by the World Bank (at the request of rich nations, like the United
States). See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Cancun Agreement Preserves an Escape Hatch for Japan
and
Other
Industrial
Nations,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
17,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/12/17/17climatewire-cancun-agreement-preserves-anescape-hatch-f-38242.html?pagewanted=all (interviewing Ned Helme, President of Center
for Clean Air Policy, who describes the Cancun Accord as “really clever” because “[e]ach
step of the way, it’s got a piece that’s taken care of each [nation’s] thing”).
63. See Climate Change Diplomacy: Back from the Brink, ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2010,
at 121 (explaining that Bolivia was the sole objector to the Cancun Accord, causing the
parties to hold that the “principle of consensus on which the conference runs does not give
one country the right to veto the will of all the others,” and allowing the Cancun Accord to
be fully adopted).
64. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 62 (noting that the Cancun Accord left the question
of a Kyoto successor open because Japan and other industrialized countries refused to
commit to mandatory emissions reductions post-2012; however, many commentators believe
that by virtue of reaching an agreement, the COP-16 parties indicated that there will be a
second Kyoto commitment period).
65. See UN Climate Change Talks in Cancun Agree [to] a Deal, BBC (Dec. 11, 2010),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11975470.
66. Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III.C, ¶¶ 68–79.
67. See Christian Schwägerl & Gerald Traufetter, Cancun Climate Summit: Can
Rainforests Be Saved with Cash Injections?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec. 7, 2010),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,733270,00.html.
68. Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III (C), ¶ 71.
69. Id. § III (C), ¶ 73.
70. Id. § III (C), ¶ 71(a)–(d).
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financing. 71 Section I.C. explores how REDD pilot projects have
developed in each of these areas absent international guidance.
C. REDD Realities: Differing Implementations of International Guidelines
Although the international community has agreed on the general
framework for REDD, there has yet to be a “consensus proposal[] for the
system’s design.” 72 Thus, REDD remains a collection of country proposals
and pilot projects, rather than a unified international plan. Existing REDD
projects differ on everything from their definitions of “forest” to their
methods of financing to their scales of implementation, causing scholars to
note that the only shared attribute in REDD programs is a lack of clarity. 73
As negotiators discuss the implementation of an international REDD
regime, it is important that there is consistency in key “unanswered
questions.” 74 This Section highlights some of the diverse and often
contradictory policy practices in existing REDD projects.
1. Definitions: What Is a “Forest”?
The UNFCCC defines “forest” as an area greater than 0.5-1 hectares (ha)
in size with 10–30 percent covered by canopy consisting of trees that reach
a height of at least two to five meters at maturity. 75 This definition
identifies canopy cover, rather than biomass content, as the defining
characteristic of a forest. UNFCCC negotiators agreed on this definition
because tree crown cover is easier to monitor and measure than biomass,
and “plays a vital role in biosphere and atmosphere interactions.” 76
Further, canopy cover has been an essential part of the definition of “forest”
that the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) has used for decades,
and thus has an established place in international law.77
Critics of the UNFCCC definition argue that by not focusing on the
biomass content of a forest, the definition does not differentiate between
plantations and natural forests. As a result, it is possible that “natural
forests that are severely degraded or converted to plantations technically
remain classified as forests.” 78 Because it is possible for biomass content to
71. See infra Part I.C.1–4.
72. See Brown, supra note 42, at 259.
73. See John Costenbader, Introduction to LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra note
17, at 3, 9.
74. See Kemen Austin et al., The REDD+ Decision in Cancun, WORLD RES. INST. (Dec.
20, 2010), http://wri.org/stories/2010/12/redd-decision-cancun.
75. Nophea Sasaki & Francis E. Putz, Critical Need for New Definitions of “Forest”
and “Forest Degradation” in Global Climate Change Agreements, CONSERVATION LETTERS,
Oct. 2009, at 226, 227.
76. Id.
77. Id. (noting an important distinction between the FAO definition, which used a 40%
tree crown cover to define “closed forest,” and the UNFCCC definition which “left it to each
country . . . to select a minimum threshold of only 10-30%,” so a country could choose the
lower number).
78. See Gavin Doyle, Additionality and Permanence, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
REDD, supra note 17, at 81, 89.
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be removed from a forest without “recognition of the loss of carbon,”
environmentalists worry that forestry companies could continue to collect
carbon payments, even while damaging a forest’s ability to sequester
carbon. 79
Because of the disagreement surrounding the UNFCCC definition of
forest, many countries have codified their own definitions in national laws.
For example, the Indonesian definition of forest explicitly states that tree
plantations cannot be classified as forests. 80 Due to the difference in
definitions, forestry projects that receive credit under the UNFCCC might
not be recognized under Indonesian law.81 This inconsistency is troubling
as it may distort statistics and ultimately result in a system that rewards
countries for forest loss. 82
2. Scope: What Activities Are Included in REDD?
As avoided deforestation projects have moved from RED to REDD to
REDD+, the types of activities that will be included in each scheme have
changed in scope.
Early discussions limited REDD to avoiding
deforestation and forest degradation. 83
In Copenhagen, however,
negotiators referenced five types of REDD activities: reducing emissions
from deforestation, reducing emissions from forest degradation,
conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable management of forests,
and enhancement of forest carbon stocks. 84
Ultimately the Copenhagen Accords only included three activities—
avoided deforestation, avoided degradation, and conservation of carbon
stocks—but a more expansive scope appeals to nations which do not have a
history of deforestation or have already made significant conservation
progress. 85 These nations argue that REDD should encourage positive
forest changes, in addition to reducing negative ones, thereby creating more
opportunities for international participation in REDD. 86 Costa Rica, for
example, significantly halted deforestation between 1997 and 2005, before
REDD reached the forefront of international debate.87 Under the
79. Rhett A. Butler, Weak Forest Definition May Undermine REDD Efforts, MONGABAY
(Aug. 20, 2009), http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0819-forests.html.
80. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, 44 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.terrestrialcarbon.org/site/DefaultSite/filesystem/documents/TCG-2009Background-Analysis-of-REDD-Regulatory-Frameworks.pdf.
81. See id.
82. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 5.
83. See Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, Global REDD Negotiations: Update and Key
Issues, in REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS: THE EMERGING AGENDA
21, 23 (Oliver Springate-Baginski & Eva Wollenberg eds., 2010).
84. See Daviet, supra note 56.
85. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24.
86. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff, supra note 83, at 23–24.
87. See Kwaw S. Andam et al., Protected Areas and Avoided Deforestation: A
Statistical Evaluation, GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, 3 (Aug. 2007), http://www.duke.edu/~asp9/
files/ParksImpacts-GEFreport-AndamEtal.pdf (“Costa Rica has one of the most widely
lauded protected areas systems and is a leader in the debate to have ‘avoided deforestation’
credits recognized by the Kyoto Protocol.”).
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Copenhagen proposal, Costa Rica would have minimal participation in
REDD, as enhancement and sustainable management of forest carbon are
not included. 88 To bypass this problem, some scholars have proposed
categorizing REDD activities to allow each country to be involved with
REDD on different levels. 89 Under this proposal, REDD would change the
behavior of countries with high deforestation rates and reward countries that
have traditionally maintained their forests, thereby alleviating any pressure
they may feel to participate in deforestation in the future.
3. Scale: Is REDD Implemented on a National or Project Level?
An additional variable in REDD proposals is the scale, or “geographical
level,” on which REDD accounting and distribution will take place.90 In
order to be effective, a REDD plan must accurately measure whether
emissions from deforestation are actually being reduced. The REDD plan
then must provide incentives such as carbon credits or community funding
to reward past reductions and/or entice future efforts. 91 There are three
possible ways to measure and reward reduced deforestation: on the national
level, the sub-national level, or through a nested approach, which is a
hybrid of the first two. 92
a. National Approach
A majority of the country proposals submitted to the UNFCCC advocate
a national scale. Under this approach, a State would establish a national
reference level to determine the baseline amount of deforestation
countrywide. 93 If, after a defined monitoring period, deforestation was
reduced as compared to the national reference level, a national government
agency would be rewarded with REDD payments from the international
community. 94 National payments could include tradable carbon credits or
money from a global climate change fund.95
The national approach would preclude a country from receiving direct
credits for emissions that are reduced on the sub-national level; however, in
order to reduce total national emissions from deforestation, a government
88. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 7.
89. One example of a phased approach to REDD is the following: Stage One would
involve countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and Ghana, whose REDD
programs would focus on avoiding leakage and future deforestation. See WertzKanounnikoff, supra note 83, at 23–24. Stage Two countries like Indonesia and Brazil
would avoid deforestation and forest degradation, while Stage Three countries such as India
and Costa Rica would continue forest conservation. Id. Finally, Vietnam, China, and other
Stage Four nations would continue afforestation and reforestation projects. Id.
90. See Arild Angelsen et al., What is the Right Scale for REDD?, in MOVING AHEAD
WITH REDD: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 31, 31 (Arild Angelson ed., 2008).
91. See Summary, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at viii, viii–x.
92. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 31.
93. See John Costenbader, Benefit Sharing, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra
note 17, at 57, 62.
94. See id.
95. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 34.
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could implement laws and policies to entice local communities to reduce
deforestation. 96 Thus, the national approach gives the government wide
discretion to implement policies that will reduce deforestation and forest
degradation. 97 This could work to the advantage of indigenous peoples,
since the national government would be responsible for paying for “any
necessary policy and administrative reforms” as well as the monitoring and
verification mechanisms, thereby reducing the financial burden of forest
communities. 98 Additionally, a national approach may create laws that
“align with national development strategies and bring long-term
development benefits.” 99
Despite these advantages, many indigenous groups disfavor a national
approach because their ability to participate in the REDD decision-making
process would be severely limited. 100 It is unlikely that local communities
would have a say in the design and implementation of national REDD
policies. Further, REDD benefit sharing would probably be inequitable,
with rewards piling up nationally and not trickling down to indigenous
peoples. 101 In addition, “[i]ndigenous groups are also worried that because
they have historically served as guardians of forests—deforestation rates in
indigenous territories are lower than in parks and unprotected areas—they
won’t qualify for REDD payments, which reward activities that reduce
forest clearing relative to a baseline of past deforestation.” 102
Regardless of its impact on indigenous communities, the national
approach may not be feasible in poorer countries that lack the capacity to
monitor deforestation adequately at the national level. 103 For these
countries, a sub-national approach may be more practical.
b. Sub-national Approach
Under a sub-national, or “project-level,” approach, REDD measurements
and payments would occur in a defined geographical area or project site.104
REDD projects could be implemented by “individuals, communities, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), private companies or national or local
governments.” 105
Because they occur on a smaller scale, sub-national REDD programs are
easier and faster to implement than programs at the national level.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63.
99. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 39.
100. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 64.
101. See id. (noting that adequate legal safeguards are necessary “to ensure participation
and objective selection of projects, centralized national systems may favour elite, larger
projects and exclude small community initiatives, raising fairness concerns and preventing
benefits from reaching local and indigenous landholders”).
102. Rhett A. Butler, Brazil’s Plan to Save the Amazon, MONGABAY (June 2, 2009),
http://news.mongabay.com/2009/0602-brazil.html.
103. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 62–63.
104. Id. at 62.
105. See Angelsen et al., supra note 90, at 32.
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Additionally, the carbon market has already utilized the sub-national
approach for various carbon-trading schemes, with relatively successful
results. 106 It may be easier for indigenous peoples to participate in the
design and implementation of REDD at the project level as well, because
the projects will be controlled by community laws and governance.107 On
the other hand, decentralization of forest governance could “lead to
increased corruption and ‘elite capture’ at local levels, as powerful groups
with government connections dominate target communities.”108 Another
potential risk at the sub-national level is that the goal of carbon
sequestration will lose priority, and practices that have traditionally
benefitted the local economy—such as deforestation—will remain
powerful. 109
c. Nested Approach
A nested, or hybrid, approach would “allow payments to go directly to
projects that achieve reductions, and also to the national level if there is a
proven overall reduction.” 110 This is different from the national approach
in that sub-national projects can receive direct funding, instead of being
utilized simply to reduce national totals. In a nested approach, the
accounting between national and sub-national level projects would need to
be “harmonized” so that “any emission reduction credits issued at the subnational level would be deducted from the national accounting.” 111
Advantages to this approach include the ability to “phase” from a nested
scale to the national scale, so that developing nations that currently lack
resources for a national approach can utilize REDD on a smaller scale while
building capacity for a national program. 112 Additionally, the nested
approach offers flexibility, so that smaller projects can receive benefits even
if net national deforestation emissions have not been reduced.113
4. Financing
The most crucial—and hotly debated—element of an international
REDD scheme is financing. The Copenhagen Accord recognizes that any
successful REDD scheme must “provide positive incentives” for countries
that take action to reduce deforestation and degradation. 114 How countries
would receive this money, however, is still uncertain. REDD pilot projects
106. Id. at 33 (noting that the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol
“could serve as a model for the institutional set-up” of a sub-national REDD program).
107. See id. at 39.
108. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63.
109. See LAWRENCE C. CHRISTY ET AL., FOREST LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
ADDRESSING CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES THROUGH LEGAL REFORM 86 (2007) (“Issues
like . . . carbon sequestration are . . . likely to lose priority when there is decentralization.”).
110. Costenbader, supra note 93, at 63.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 24, ¶ 6.
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and proposals suggest that, similar to scope, there are three mechanisms
through which finances could be provided: the carbon market, a dedicated
fund, or a hybrid of the two. 115 This section briefly explores what stages of
financing are necessary to implement REDD, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each financing mechanism.
a. Stages of Financing
It is generally agreed that there are two phases to REDD that will need
funding. 116 The first is a capacity-building phase, also referred to as
The capacity-building phase includes, among other
“readiness.” 117
activities, building “infrastructure for monitoring emission reductions,
clarifying land tenure, and strengthening institutional capacities for law
enforcement.” 118 This stage is essential for building a legal framework that
can support REDD activities and ensure that REDD protects international
obligations regarding indigenous rights.
The second stage of funding “comes into play when countries have
adequately prepared to reduce, monitor, account for, and verify emissions
reductions.” 119 Funding at this stage includes both financing the costs of
reducing emissions, as well as the costs of protecting the forest and
distributing benefits and opportunity costs. 120 In order to make up for a
loss of livelihood that comes from deforestation, “[f]inancing for this stage
of REDD will need to represent a viable and long-term alternative to the
income generated through activities resulting in deforestation and
degradation.” 121
b. Financing Mechanisms
There are three broad proposals for REDD financing: carbon marketbased, non-market-based, or a hybrid of the two. 122 The market-based
approach allows companies in Annex I countries to offset part of their
emission reduction obligations by paying for avoided deforestation and
degradation projects in developing nations.123 This approach is similar to
115. See Daviet, supra note 56. See generally Charlotte Streck, Financing REDD: A
Review of Selected Policy Proposals, WWF (Jan. 2009), http://assets.panda.org/
downloads/redd.pdf (providing an outline of REDD funding proposals submitted by ten
countries and eight NGOs).
116. See Michael Dutschke et al., How Do We Match Country Needs with Financing
Sources?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at 41, 41–42.
117. See id. at 42.
118. See id.
119. T. Johns et al., A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and
Private Forest Stewards into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458,
461 (2010).
120. See Dutschke et al., supra note 116, at 42.
121. Johns, supra note 119, at 461.
122. Clarke, supra note 40, at 43.
123. See T. Johns et al., supra note 119, at 460; see also Andrew Macintosh, Can Money
Grow on Trees?: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) in
Developing Countries, AUSTL. COUNCIL FOR INT’L DEV., 22–31 (Oct. 2010),
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the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol, which
allows Annex I countries to earn “credits” by paying for avoided
deforestation projects in developing countries, while continuing “business
as usual” back home. 124 While the only forestry projects permitted under
the CDM are afforestation and reforestation projects, market-based REDD
financing would expand these benefits to avoided deforestation and
degradation projects. 125
An important restriction of market-based funding is that project
developers can only earn credits for “additional” projects, that is, the
emissions reduction would not otherwise have occurred. “For forest credits
to be traded in international carbon markets, the reductions in emissions
must be measurable, and they must be over and above what would have
happened otherwise.” 126 To make sure a REDD project is “additional,” a
“reference level must be established, which forms the baseline against
which the impact of programmes to reduce deforestation is measured.” 127
Because of the baseline requirement in market-based funding, countries
that do not have historically high levels of deforestation, or those who have
already taken steps to reduce deforestation, may not benefit. 128 Marketbased financing is additionally criticized because it would allow the market
to control REDD, possibly to the exclusion of local communities. This
possibility is greatest in countries that have a high prevalence of corruption
and have weak forest tenure structures. 129
On the other hand, the market-based approach is encouraged because it
would likely allow for the greatest amount of funds to be raised for REDD.
A market-based REDD scheme would encourage private investors to
become involved with REDD by making carbon a valuable commodity and
increasing private sector confidence. 130 Because of this, many believe that
a market-based scheme is the best financing mechanism to produce enough
money to make REDD financially viable. 131
Most NGOs and indigenous peoples’ groups support a non-market based
mechanism for funding, however, which would likely be a voluntary or
compulsory fund created by “Annex I countries, and distributed to
http://www.redd-monitor.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ACFID-REDDreport.pdf (explaining how REDD can be linked to the carbon market).
124. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 15–17.
125. See id.
126. Kate Dooley, Why Congo Basin Countries Stand to Lose Out from a Market-Based
REDD, FERN, 2 (Dec. 2009), http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/congo%20basin%
20countries%20lose%20out.pdf.
127. Id.
128. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 19.
129. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (explaining that indigenous groups are in
danger of losing their livelihoods without seeing any financial compensation, as marketbased REDD programs do not allow for indigenous participation and frequently distribute
finances to powerful government groups and corporations, bypassing vulnerable indigenous
communities); see also id. at 29 (noting that market-based REDD could exacerbate poverty
and force indigenous communities to relocate).
130. See MERIDIAN INST., FOSTERING CARBON MARKETS INVESTMENT IN REDD 7–8
(2009).
131. See Dutschke et al., supra note 116, at 52.
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participating developing countries to aid and reward their efforts to reduce
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.” 132 This method of
funding more closely resembles development assistance, as money comes
from discretionary aid donors and voluntary sources, not compliance
markets. 133 A fund-based mechanism is considered to be safer and easier
for local communities who wish to protect their forests. This method of
financing is better able to support REDD-capacity-building efforts, which
must take place in a country before the REDD projects start generating
money on the carbon market. 134 Many indigenous groups fear that, absent
fund-based financing, capacity building will be limited, and the protections
that indigenous groups need will not be built into a REDD legal
framework. 135
Finally, there are additional proposals for financing that involve a mix
between market- and fund-based approaches. These so-called “hybrid”
methods of financing could involve taxes or levies, in which a fixed
percentage of international carbon trading schemes would be set aside for
REDD funding. Proponents of this method of financing state that it can
combine the benefits of market finance with the delivery of social benefits
to local communities.136 Currently, the majority of REDD projects utilize
fund-based mechanisms, but more and more market-based approaches are
predicted to emerge in a few years’ time, causing many commentators to
predict that, ultimately, both approaches will coexist.137
The environmental, economic, and social impacts of REDD ultimately
depend upon which policy variables are selected in the international REDD
agreement.
Because of the uncertainty surrounding REDD—and
indigenous groups’ inability to influence REDD decisions 138—many forestdwelling peoples are opposed to avoided deforestation programs. The
following section provides background on the interplay between indigenous
rights and REDD, explaining where indigenous rights are found in
international law and how those rights are upheld, or ignored, in existing
REDD proposals. Part I.D. also emphasizes the importance of protecting
indigenous rights in future REDD proposals.

132. T. Johns et al., supra note 119, at 460.
133. See David Brown et al., How Do We Achieve Co-benefits and Avoid Doing Harm?,
in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra note 90, at 107, 110–11.
134. See Louis V. Verchot & Elena Petkova, The State of REDD Negotiations:
Consensus Points, Options for Moving Forward and Research Needs to Support the Process,
CTR. FOR INT’L FORESTRY RESEARCH, 15 (Oct. 2009), http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/
redd_state_of_negotiations.pdf.
135. See generally Macintosh, supra note 123.
136. See Last Gasp for the Forest, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2009, at 93–95.
137. See id.
138. See, e.g., Griffiths, supra note 10, at 9 (noting that indigenous groups have
repeatedly complained that they do not have adequate representation during UNFCCC
climate negotiations, and thus are unable to impact the outcome of negotiations).
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D. “No Rights, No REDD”: Indigenous Peoples’ Response to REDD
While policymakers have agreed on the benefits of REDD programs at
the international level, many forest-dwelling peoples are worried about the
effects REDD will have on the ground. 139 Indigenous groups in particular
have expressed concern that by placing a price tag on trees, “REDD
programmes could undermine some of the ecosystem services that forests
provide locally, such as providing food, fuel and medicine to the millions of
poor who live in and depend on the forests.” 140
Indigenous groups argue that there is both a moral and practical
imperative for emphasizing equity and protecting indigenous rights in
REDD. 141 They assert that it is fundamentally unfair that REDD would
curb development for indigenous peoples, who have contributed least to
climate change, while allowing Annex I nations to continue business as
usual. 142 If REDD is designed without the input of forest-dwelling peoples,
Annex I nations may be able to benefit economically and environmentally
from indigenous groups’ loss of livelihood.143 Practically speaking, REDD
policies will be most successful when they have the cooperation and
support of the people who have been traditional stewards of the forests.
Environmental NGOs and researchers agree that “‘REDD will never
succeed . . . without the involvement of the [communities] that are making
decisions every day as to whether to cut a tree down or leave it
standing.’” 144
Indigenous peoples have highlighted three key areas that should be
included in REDD schemes. First, indigenous peoples should have the right
to participate in the REDD decision-making process, “in accordance with
the[ir] right to free, prior and informed consent.” 145 Second, REDD should
respect indigenous property rights to lands and resources, in accordance
with international human rights instruments and obligations.146 Finally,
REDD should “[r]ecognize the fundamental role and contribution of
indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, innovations and practices.”147

139. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (noting that indigenous groups have protested
UNFCCC REDD proposals because they lack adequate safeguards for indigenous rights);
SEYMOUR, supra note 44 (suggesting that environmental policies should be equitable and
include indigenous input).
140. See Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 271.
141. Cf. Adianto P. Simamora, No Rights, No REDD: Communities, JAKARTA POST (July
1, 2010), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2010/07/01/no-rights-no-redd-communities.
html (quoting Abdon Nababan, the Secretary General of the Alliance of Archipelagic
Indigenous People, who was speaking about the impact of REDD on indigenous rights in
Indonesia).
142. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10.
143. See generally id.
144. Anderson, supra note 10, at 26; see also Florence Daviet et al., REDD Flags: What
We Need to Know About the Options, WORLD RES. INST., 2 (Dec. 2007),
http://pdf.wri.org/redd-flags.pdf (noting that indigenous participation is “fundamental” to the
success of any REDD program).
145. Fincke, supra note 29, at 5.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Indigenous communities have warned that they will reject the
implementation of an international REDD scheme unless it guarantees their
rights to livelihood in the forests.148 The Secretary-General of the Alliance
of Archipelagic Indigenous Peoples summed up a common sentiment when
he bluntly told reporters, “Our stance is clear—no rights, no REDD.” 149
1. Indigenous Rights in International Law
In 1989, the International Labour Organization’s Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169) was
adopted. 150 Although only ratified by twenty-two nations, ILO 169 is still
recognized as the paramount international law guaranteeing the rights of
indigenous peoples. 151 ILO 169 “outlines the special rights of such peoples
regarding activity on their customary lands.”152 In its parts most pertinent
to REDD, ILO 169 grants indigenous peoples the rights to “exercise control
. . . over their own economic, social and cultural development” and
participate in development plans that “may affect them directly.” 153 In
addition, Article 14 guarantees that indigenous peoples’ “rights of
ownership and possession . . . over the lands which they traditionally
occupy shall be recognised” 154 and Article 16 states that they “shall not be
removed from the lands which they occupy.” 155
Indigenous peoples’ rights were further recognized in 2007 by the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 156
Approved by the UN thirty years after it was originally introduced,
UNDRIP builds on ILO 169 by emphasizing that parties are required to
“grant legal title to indigenous peoples’ customary lands and to ensure their
free, prior, and informed consent for any activity on, or their resettlement
from, their lands.” 157 While UNDRIP is not binding, it does “provide[]
evidence of a worldwide consensus on indigenous peoples’ right to self-

148. See, e.g., United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, N.Y.C., U.S., Apr.
21–May 2, 2008, Report on the Seventh Session, ¶¶ 44–45, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2008/13
(2008) (stating that indigenous peoples will not support REDD policies unless they uphold
social justice, environmental justice, and human rights).
149. Simamora, supra note 141.
150. See International Labour Organization Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
(June 27, 1989), Geneva, Switz., Convention 169, available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgilex/convde.pl?C169 [hereinafter ILO 169].
151. See Convention No. 169, INT’L LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/
cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011) (noting that Brazil ratified ILO 169 in
2002, but Indonesia has not ratified as of October 2011).
152. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 276.
153. ILO 169, supra note 150, at art. 7.
154. Id. at art. 14.
155. Id. at art. 16.
156. See United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. DOC A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
157. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 277; see also UNDRIP, supra note 156, at
art. 26 (recognizing that “[i]ndigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and
resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired”).
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determination.” 158 In fact, 144 nations voted that the UN should approve
UNDRIP, while only four (Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and
Australia) voted against the Declaration.159 All four nations have since
reversed their decisions and signed UNDRIP. 160
a. Free, Prior, Informed Consent
Both UNDRIP and ILO 169 explicitly recognize that indigenous peoples
have a right to “free, prior and informed consent” (FPIC) regarding
activities that directly or indirectly affect them. 161 FPIC is crucial to the
protection of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination. 162 “Free”
implies that local communities should not be coerced, manipulated, or
“Prior” means that local
intimidated while making decisions.163
communities are contacted well before the authorization or implementation
of any activities, and that there is sufficient time for consultation. 164
“Informed” means that indigenous peoples have knowledge of the
nature, size, duration, pace, reversibility, scope and areas of the proposed
activities; that they know the reasons why the project/activity is being
proposed; and that they have access to a preliminary assessment of the
possible economic, social and environmental impacts (including potential
risks as well as fair and equitable benefit sharing . . .). 165

In addition, some commentators urge that local communities should be
able to participate in decisions that affect their livelihoods through their
own freely chosen representatives and customary institutions.166 Others
argue that REDD processes should be carefully constructed so that FPIC is
protected, otherwise REDD will violate international human rights
obligations, potentially harm indigenous livelihood and self-determination,
and create further environmental vulnerabilities. 167

158. Melissa Farris, Note, The Sound of Falling Trees: Integrating Environmental
Justice Principles into the Climate Change Framework for Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 534 (2010).
159. See UNDRIP Adopted by the General Assembly, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT
FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/declaration.html (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
160. See id.
161. See UNDRIP, supra note 156, at arts. 10, 19, 28, 29; see also ILO 169, supra note
150, at art. 14.
162. See Enrique Ibarra Gené & Arif Aliadi, REDD (Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Forest Degradation): Mitigation, Adaptation and the Resilience of Local
Livelihoods 5 (Asia Sec. Initiative Policy Series, Working Paper No. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/NTS/resources/research_papers/MacArthur%20Working%20Paper_E
nrique_and_Arif.pdf.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (elaborating that informed “also means [indigenous groups] know who are likely
to be involved in the execution of the proposed project (including community members,
private sector staff, research institutions, government employees, etc.) and that they
understand the procedures that may be involved”).
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Fincke, supra note 29, at 5.
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b. The Right to Property
In addition to being found in specific indigenous rights agreements, the
right to hold property is identified as a general human right in both Article
17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 168 and Article 21 of the
American Convention on Human Rights. 169 Despite the widespread
recognition of property rights, indigenous peoples are frequently stripped of
their ownership entitlements, due in large part to the complexities of land
tenure systems in developing countries.170 In such systems, property rights
frequently exist as both formally recognized statutory property rights and as
informal customary rights. 171 Overlapping systems of property rights often
lead to legal “disputes between competing claimants,” undermining the
security of both rights regimes. 172 Indigenous peoples are especially
vulnerable when statutory rights do not recognize customary rights because
they largely live and work on lands that are not formally titled.173
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has issued two
rulings regarding the protection of customary land rights. In 2001, the
IACHR found that “the state must obtain consent from indigenous
communities for activities on lands they have historically occupied and that
the state must enact procedures to grant these communities legal title to
their lands in order to uphold the Right to Property.” 174 Moreover, in the
case of Saramaka People v. Suriname, 175 the IACHR found that the right to
property required the Suriname government to grant the Saramaka people
legal title to their customary lands.176 Although the court held that the
Saramaka people have the right to own natural resources on their customary
land, it found that the State may still restrict the “‘use of property in
circumstances that are defined by law and that are proportionate to the

168. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 17 U.N. Doc.
A/RES/3/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
169. American Convention on Human Rights art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, 5 O.A.S.T.S. 36,
1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
170. See Gershon Feder et al., Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and
Implications for Development Policy 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 135 (1991). See generally
Jeffery Hatcher, Securing Tenure Rights and Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and
Degradation (REDD): Costs and Lessons Learned (Rights & Res. Initiative, Working Paper
No. 120, 2009), available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/documents/files/
doc_1474.pdf.
171. See Hatcher, supra note 170, at 4.
172. See Annalisa Savaresi & Elisa Morgera, Ownership of Land, Forest and Carbon, in
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR REDD, supra note 17, at 15, 16.
173. See id.
174. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 279. See generally Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug.
31, 2001); Jonathan Vuotto, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: International Precedent for
Indigenous Land Rights? 22 B.U. INT’L L.J. 219 (2004) (providing further commentary on
the impact of the Awas Tingni decision).
175. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Nov. 28, 2007).
176. See id.
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achievement of a legitimate objective.’” 177 Thus, the State may grant
concessions on the territory to logging and mining companies.178
Along with statutory and customary ownership rights, property can also
be classified as either private or public. Private ownership is “generally
characterized by rights that cannot be unilaterally extinguished by
government, without some form of due process and compensation.”179
Both individuals and communities, such as indigenous groups, are eligible
to own private property. 180 Publicly owned land is managed directly by
government agencies, who may allocate the land to communities or
indigenous groups for management purposes on a “permanent or semipermanent basis.” 181 In many developing countries, indigenous groups live
on publicly owned land. Thus, even if the government allocates certain
rights over the land or resources, it may ultimately reserve the right to
access or sell the land. 182
In the context of carbon property rights, the interplay between public and
private land rights creates multiple ownership options. One possibility is
that carbon rights and land rights will be intertwined, such that the owner of
a forest is also the owner of the carbon stored inside the forest. 183 In this
scenario, the sequestered carbon does not exist as a separate entitlement.
Thus, the “forest owner could not sell or give the carbon away
independently of the forest.” 184 Alternatively, the carbon could be “subject
to a separate, alienable property right, independent of the property of the
forest, [so that] the owner could sell that right without conveying forest
ownership.” 185 This scenario would incorporate usufruct rights, which
create property arrangements in which one entity may “use and derive
benefit from property that belongs to another entity,” as long as the property
is not impaired. 186 Most likely, usufruct rights over sequestered carbon
would be in the form of profit á prendre, which is a specific kind of
easement that grants one entity the right to access a plot of land belonging
to another entity and take biological resources that are found naturally on

177. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 280 (quoting James Harrison, International
Law—Significant Environmental Cases 2007-08, 20 J. ENVTL. L. 475, 481 (2008)).
178. See Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172. See generally Marcos A.
Orellana, Saramaka People v. Suriname, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 841 (2008) (discussing how
indigenous rights were changed following Saramaka).
179. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 19. See generally Hatcher, supra note 170
(explaining that private ownership is most secure, as governments and other powerful actors
have more difficulty expropriating private land rights).
180. See generally LORENZO COTULA ET AL., TENURE IN REDD: START POINT OR
AFTERTHOUGHT? (2009) (discussing various structures of forest property rights).
181. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 19.
182. See ANDY WHITE ET AL., WHO OWNS THE WORLD’S FORESTS? FOREST TENURE AND
PUBLIC FORESTS IN TRANSITION 8 (2002).
183. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 24.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See David Takacs, Forest Carbon: Law and Property Rights, CONSERVATION INT’L,
15 (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.conservation.org/Documents/CI_Climate_Forest-Carbon_
Law-Property-Rights_Takacs_Nov09.pdf.
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the land. 187 Profits á prendre are generally long term rights, as opposed to
the right to enter land just once to collect recently fallen trees.188 Thus, in
the carbon context, it is possible that a landowner will grant profit á
prendre to another entity, who will manage the trees for carbon
sequestration purposes without actually owning the area. 189
Additionally, “the carbon sequestered in forests may be treated as a
publicly-owned asset, regardless of forest and land ownership.” 190 Even if
a forest were privately owned, the state could declare the sequestered
carbon as a public asset and manage the carbon (and the forest), then
distribute benefits to the forest owners. 191 In this way, the government
would own the carbon. In this situation, the government may have the
power to sell the carbon, in which case it could put the benefits earned from
the sequestered carbon into a trust for the good of either the private forest
owners or the general public. 192 Additionally, depending on national laws,
the government might require forest owners to protect the carbon and avoid
deforestation. 193
There is a high probability that vulnerable indigenous groups will be
further marginalized by REDD. 194 One primary concern is that indigenous
peoples who have customary land rights on government land will be
ordered to stop deforestation—thereby giving up their livelihood—and yet
will not receive any financial benefits from the sale of sequestered
carbon. 195 In addition to indigenous concerns, prominent environmental
economic reports emphasize the importance of a clear property rights
framework. For example, the Stern Review emphasizes the importance of
property rights and argues that a clear rights structure is essential to
effective forest management for carbon sequestration. 196 Similarly, the
Eliasch Review emphasizes that a property rights system which provides
benefits to poor people and forest communities is necessary for the longterm sustainability of REDD. 197

187. See, e.g., Karen Gould et al., Legislative Approaches to Forest Sinks in Australia
and New Zealand: Working Models for Other Jurisdictions?, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND
FORESTS, supra note 28, at 253, 253–71 (explaining that the government of New South
Wales, Australia was the first to create a specific property right in forest carbon, and did so
following a profit á prendre model).
188. See id. at 262.
189. See id. at 262–63.
190. Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 25.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 25–26.
193. Id. at 26.
194. See id.; see also William Sunderlin, Tenure: What Will REDD Mean for Forest
Communities?, in REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE, AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS, supra note 83, at
31, 32 (defining “tenure” as “the right . . . that determines who can hold and use forestlands
and resources, for how long and under what conditions,” and explaining that clearly defined
tenure that recognizes customary rights is necessary for the protection of indigenous rights in
REDD).
195. See COTULA, supra note 180, at 15–18.
196. See generally STERN, supra note 9.
197. See generally ELIASCH, supra note 9.
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2. Indigenous Rights (or the Lack Thereof) in REDD
Absent uniform international guidelines, REDD country proposals and
pilot projects are varied in their primary goals and policy practices.
Generally speaking, however, each REDD program is guided by the “3E”
criteria: effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. 198 Effectiveness means the
REDD program creates significant emissions reductions, while efficiency
asks if the reductions are being achieved at minimum cost.199 Equity looks
at who is bearing the burden and benefits of REDD, both among and within
nations. 200 While ideally the 3Es would exist in equilibrium, many REDD
projects view the criteria as trade-offs, rather than a balance. In efforts to
make REDD financially and environmentally appealing, equity is most
frequently sacrificed. 201 This section explores both national REDD
proposals and voluntary REDD projects in terms of how well they actualize
the third “E” by protecting indigenous rights.
a. Rights in REDD Proposals
Existing REDD proposals do not contain “explicit recognition of the
need to respect the rights of indigenous peoples.” 202 General language
regarding indigenous rights was included in the preamble to the COP-13
REDD decision, which states: “[T]he needs of local and indigenous
communities should be addressed when action is taken to reduce emissions
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries.”203
Indigenous parties were not satisfied, protesting that vague language placed
in the preamble of the COP-13 agreement was not strong enough to
The International Forum of
adequately safeguard their rights.204
Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change adamantly protested REDD,
claiming that it would create more violations of indigenous rights, giving
“States and Carbon Traders control . . . over the forests.” 205 The
indigenous community’s primary concern was over property rights, as they
198. See Arild Angelson & Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff, What Are the Key Design Issues
for REDD and the Criteria for Assessing Options?, in MOVING AHEAD WITH REDD, supra
note 90, at 11, 18–21.
199. See id. at 18–19.
200. See id. at 20–21 (elaborating that equity can be measured on two levels: within a
single nation, equality means that REDD benefits are being fairly distributed at all levels,
while on the international scale, equity means that all nations are able to participate in
REDD, regardless of their wealth).
201. See generally Griffiths, supra note 10 (noting that because indigenous groups are not
adequately represented in UNFCCC negotiations, REDD decisions favor the power
players—such as big companies and governments—who are more concerned with the
economics than the equality of REDD).
202. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 7.
203. Bali Roadmap, supra note 51, at pmbl.
204. See Statement by the International Forum of Indigenous Peoples on Climate Change
(IFIPCC) on ‘Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’ (REDD)
Agenda Item at the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME (Nov. 1,
2007),
http://www.forestpeoples.org/topics/un-framework-convention-climate-changeunfccc/news/2011/05/statement-international-forum-indi.
205. Id.
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worried that they would lose access to their customary lands and
Additionally, indigenous peoples stated the need for
resources. 206
improved participation in UNFCCC deliberations, arguing that they should
be included in intergovernmental decisions that will directly affect
indigenous rights and livelihood. 207
In 2008, eight Amazonian countries signed The Manaus Declaration and
Areas of Consensus and Disagreement to “ensure the full exercise of the
sovereign rights of the Amazon countries over the resources of the region’s
biological diversity.” 208 Signatories to the Manaus Declaration agreed that
REDD projects must “recognise the capability of sustainable management
of forests as exercised by indigenous peoples and traditional communities,
as well as the historical role of these peoples and communities in the
conservation and in the equilibrium of global climate to develop a
compensation system.” 209
Although indigenous activists stressed that there must be a stronger
commitment to protect rights and equity in future Convention agreements,
the Copenhagen Accord did not contain any specific safeguards of
indigenous rights. 210 The lack of rights protection was part of the reason
that the COP-15 did not yield an agreement, as some countries refused to
support an agreement that did not reference indigenous rights.211 COP-16’s
Cancun Accord is credited for including rights safeguards because it
requests that each country develop a system to track rights protection before
implementing REDD programs. 212 While this is seen as a big step towards
ensuring that REDD respects indigenous rights, the Accord’s language does
not contain specific details for the implementation of a rights-tracking
system. 213 For example, there is no guidance regarding what information
must be collected, how the information will be shared, or for what
purpose. 214 Further, the Accord does not name any intergovernmental
206. See generally Climate Change, Human Rights and Indigenous Peoples, INT’L INDIAN
TREATY COUNCIL (2008), http://www.treatycouncil.org/PDF/HR%20IPS%20and%20
Climate%20Change%20corrfinal122708OHCHRa.pdf.
207. See generally id.
208. See Mario Osava, The Manaus Declaration: 8 Countries Assert Sovereignty over
the Amazon Rainforest, MONGABAY, http://www.mongabay.com/external/ACTO.htm (last
visited Oct. 20, 2011).
209. Lawlor & Huberman, supra note 16, at 273 (internal quotations omitted).
210. See Fincke, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that COP agreements reference human rights
documents but do not provide explicit guidelines to protect human rights).
211. See Press Release, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bolivia Decries Adoption of
Copenhagen Accord II Without Consensus (Dec. 11, 2010), available at
http://pwccc.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/press-release-history-will-be-the-judge.pdf
(claiming that Bolivia opposed both the Copenhagen and Cancun Accords because they did
not adequately protect indigenous communities against rights abuses); see also Bodansky,
supra note 23, at 231 (noting that Bolivia and Venezuela led a small group of nations in
opposition against the Copenhagen Accord).
212. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72); see also Climate Change
Diplomacy, supra note 63.
213. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72); see also Austin, supra note 74
(providing further commentary on which safeguards are absent from international REDD
agreements).
214. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(c)(72).
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institution that would help gather information and determine if adequate
rights safeguards are in place. 215
b. Indigenous Rights in Voluntary REDD Projects
While the UNFCCC agreements don’t explicitly safeguard indigenous
rights, international standards within the voluntary carbon market require
certain rights protections before REDD pilot projects will be approved.216
Because an international REDD regime has not yet been established,
current REDD projects exist within a voluntary system which has
developed its own rules to regulate REDD. 217 Voluntary REDD projects
must meet certain standards in order to receive certification, which
promotes the project’s legitimacy and makes it more attractive to
investors. 218 The international community has consolidated around a select
number of standards that are expected to “shape the ‘law’ governing
voluntary forest carbon schemes.” 219 This section focuses on two standards
that promote the community benefits (as opposed to the monitoring and
verification efficiency) of REDD projects—the Community, Climate, and
Biodiversity Alliance (CCB) and the Forest Carbon Partnership Fund.
i. Climate, Community, and Biodiversity Standards
For assessing the broader social and environmental impacts of projects,
the CCB Standards dominate.220 The CCB Alliance is a conglomerate of
international NGOs and research institutions that developed voluntary
standards to help ensure that REDD projects create a sustainable
environment while allowing indigenous peoples to maintain a sustainable
lifestyle. 221 The CCB Alliance promotes its standards as a catch-all,
applicable to both government-led and voluntary REDD programs,
regardless of whether they are implemented at a national or regional level,
or financed through funds or the carbon market. 222 Different from other
voluntary standards that regulate accounting mechanisms, the CCB
standards aim to “ensur[e] that there are net community and biodiversity

215. See id.
216. See Overview: Forest Carbon Standards in the Voluntary Market, CARBON
POSITIVE, http://116.12.48.151/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1433 (last visited Oct. 20, 2011)
(providing descriptions of the main standards regulating the voluntary carbon market,
including the Voluntary Carbon Standards, which provide guidelines for carbon
measurement and verification, and the Community, Climate, and Biodiversity Standards,
which provide regulations regarding the social impacts of REDD).
217. See Nina Chestney, Forestry Gains Momentum in Voluntary Carbon Market,
REUTERS,
(Sept.
28,
2010,
12:15
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/
idUSTRE68R3IR20100928.
218. See id.
219. Takacs, supra note 186, at 24.
220. See id.
221. Home, CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, http://www.climatestandards.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
222. See id.
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benefits to a planned [REDD] project.” 223 Because they focus on cobenefits, rather than accounting mechanisms, the CCB standards are
frequently used in conjunction with other voluntary standards that are more
measurement-focused. 224
The CCB Standards are used to certify REDD schemes at the project
level, independent of national REDD programs. A third-party auditor will
evaluate each project that has applied to be CCB certified. In an effort to
keep costs manageable and to have credible evaluators, the CCB Alliance
“may authorize certifiers already approved by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism, the California Climate Action Registry, [or
other] existing forest certification programs.” 225 The Standards are
separated into four sections: general, climate, community, and biodiversity.
To be approved, a REDD project must fulfill the fifteen required standards,
which include “Net Positive Community Impacts,” “Community Impact
Monitoring,” and “Land Tenure” evaluation.226 There are also a number of
“optional” standards that, if met, would elevate the REDD project to
“Silver” or “Gold” certification.227 REDD capacity building is one of these
optional criteria.228
The CCB Standards have received positive feedback from NGOs that
represent indigenous groups, who have reported that “‘CCB Standards
are . . . extremely important as a means to safeguard and promote the
interest of . . . often marginalized groups.’”229 Because the Standards are
relatively new, however, their long-term ability to protect indigenous rights
in a REDD regime remains untested.
ii. World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Fund
The World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund (FCPF) aims to
“assist Eligible REDD Countries in their efforts to achieve emission
reductions . . . by providing them with financial and technical assistance in
building their capacity to benefit from . . . future systems of positive
incentives for REDD.” 230 Unlike the project-based CCB standards, the

223. See Rules for the Use of the Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standards,
CLIMATE, COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 3 (June 21, 2010),
http://www.scscertified.com/docs/CCB_Standards_Rules_062110.pdf.
224. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 24 (noting that the Voluntary Carbon Standard and
the Clean Development Mechanism are voluntary standards that focus on accounting
mechanisms in REDD, and can be used simultaneously with the CCB Standards).
225. Climate, Community and Biodiversity Project Design Standards, CLIMATE,
COMMUNITY AND BIODIVERSITY ALLIANCE, 5 (Oct. 2005), http://www.climate-standards.org/
images/pdf/CCBStandards.pdf.
226. Id. at 6–7.
227. Id. at 7.
228. Id.
229. New Standards Ensure Forest Carbon Projects Protect Indigenous People,
Biodiversity, MONGABAY (Dec. 8, 2008), http://news.mongabay.com/2008/1208-ccba.html
(quoting Charles Ehrhart, head of the Climate Change Program at CARE International).
230. Charter Establishing the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, INT’L BANK FOR
RECONSTRUCTION
&
DEV.,
May
11,
2011,
at
11,
available
at
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FCPF works at the national level, helping countries become better equipped
to adopt REDD programs. 231 In October 2008, over forty developing
nations expressed interest in working with the FCPF. 232
There are two FCPF funds—a Readiness Fund and a Carbon Fund—
which are implemented in stages. While the Carbon Fund will help with
developing the carbon market once the REDD project has been
implemented, the Readiness phase focuses on capacity building before
REDD begins. 233 The Readiness Fund aims to protect indigenous
communities by developing guidelines for national legal frameworks, such
as property rights, community involvement, and local governance.234
Countries interested in participating must submit a Readiness Plan Idea
Note (R-PIN) to the FCPF. 235 If approved, the country will receive grants
to assist with REDD planning. Unlike the CCB Standards, capacity
building is mandatory before a project can receive further FCPF funding
and approval. 236
The FCPF claims to be “inclusive of all the stakeholders and rightsholders in the forest sector.” 237 Even so, the FCPF has been maligned by
indigenous groups for “violating its own rules” and failing to safeguard
indigenous rights, most importantly the right to FPIC. 238 The FCPF was
criticized in 2007 for prematurely launching REDD pilot projects in an
effort to have data ready to present at COP-13 in Bali. 239 As a result, the
FCPF implemented a “rushed design” and did not properly consult with
indigenous groups. 240 In addition, the FCPF has faced criticism for
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Document
s/PDF/May2011/FCPF%20Charter%20-%20CF%2005-11-2011%20clean.pdf.
231. See Kate Dooley et al., Cutting Corners: World Bank’s Forest and Carbon Fund
Fails Forests and Peoples, FERN, 5 (Nov. 2008), http://www.fern.org/sites/fern.org/files/
document%20cutting%20corners.pdf.
232. See Crystal Davis et al., A Review of 25 Readiness Plan Idea Notes from the World
Bank Carbon Partnership Facility 1 (World Res. Inst., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://pdf.wri.org/world_bank_readiness_review.pdf (providing a detailed analysis of 25
countries that have already started to work with FCPF).
233. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 82.
234. See id. at 82–83.
235. See Davis et al., supra note 232, at 1 (noting that the first step for developing
countries who wish to reduce deforestation and access World Bank funds is an R-PIN).
236. See id.
237. FCPF Brochure, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, at 16 (2009), available at
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/Document
s/PDF/Sep2010/New%20FCPF%20brochure%20--%20low%20resolution%20051809_0.pdf.
The FCPF General Information Memorandum states: “[I]t is important that these actors
participate early on in the readiness process. Countries will . . . make special efforts to
ensure that forest-dependent indigenous peoples and other forest dwellers meaningfully
participate in decisions that may affect them and that their rights are respected.” Information
Memorandum, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY, 4–5 (June 13, 2008),
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/sites/forestcarbonpartnership.org/files/
Documents/PDF/FCPF_Info_Memo_06-13-08.pdf.
238. Griffiths, supra note 10, at 11–12. See generally Dooley et al., supra note 231.
239. See Mrinalini Rai, REDD and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Ensuring Equity
and Participation in World Bank Funds, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT (Apr. 17 2009),
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-564322.
240. Id.

2011]

THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK

851

allowing countries with underdeveloped R-PINs to receive REDD
funding. 241
II. REDD RAMIFICATIONS: THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF REDD
IN BRAZIL AND INDONESIA
Although REDD standards in the voluntary carbon market have helped
make rights protection an expected norm, the standards do not have the
same persuasive power as national law. As indicated by the Cancun
Accord, however, national legal frameworks will play a key role in the
practical implementation of REDD, and will directly affect rights protection
in each country. 242 Part II compares the legal frameworks of Brazil and
Indonesia, analyzing how existing forestry legislation and new REDDspecific regulations protect indigenous rights in REDD.
As the international community focuses on which policy practices would
be most effective in a global REDD regime, the legal consequences of
REDD design and implementation mechanisms have received less
attention. 243 Legal clarity, especially at the national level, will be essential
to the success of REDD projects, which must coexist with laws and
regulations governing investment, taxes, property, and forestry—to name a
few. 244 Regardless of international REDD agreements, national law will
ultimately dictate how REDD is implemented on the ground, thereby
determining how REDD will affect the lives of forest-dwelling peoples.
REDD can either be integrated into existing national law or be the
impetus for new laws that prevent deforestation. 245 National constitutions,
for example, frequently have broad environmental protection provisions
that can be used as the foundation for REDD. 246 Additionally, REDD can
be incorporated into existing environmental law, such as a national
environmental policy act or regulations that specifically govern the forestry
sector. 247 If preexisting laws will not adequately implement REDD,
however, countries can create specific laws or regulations to “cover REDD
comprehensively.” 248 Most likely, it will be necessary both to create new
241. See Davis et al., supra note 232, at 2–3; see also Chris Lang, Review of World Bank
Approved R-PINs Finds Critical Issues Are Conspicuously Missing, REDD-MONITOR (Mar.
12, 2009), http://www.redd-monitor.org/2009/03/12/world-resources-institute-review-ofworld-bank-approved-r-pins-finds-critical-issues-are-conspicuously-missing/ (noting that
adequate tenure clarity, law enforcement, and monitoring mechanisms were missing from
many of the approved R-PINs).
242. See Cancun Accord, supra note 61, § III(C), ¶¶ 68–79 (requesting that, before
undertaking REDD activities, each country develops a national REDD plan, a national
reference emission level, a national forest monitoring system, and a system to address
safeguards for indigenous peoples’ rights).
243. See id.
244. See Costenbader, supra note 93, at 4–5 (noting that other legal areas that should be
considered include investment law, tax law, and monitoring, reporting, and verification of
REDD projects).
245. See id. at 11–13.
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 12.
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laws and integrate REDD into the preexisting legal framework, because
constitutional provisions should be accompanied by new legislation
detailing how to implement REDD, and independent laws must be in
accordance with the established constitution.249
This Part compares the legal frameworks of Brazil and Indonesia, the
worldwide leaders in deforestation. After giving a general overview of the
governance structure and deforestation challenges in each nation, this Part
specifically focuses on the laws and regulations regarding forest carbon
ownership, REDD financing, and benefit distribution.
A. Brazil
Encompassing 477,698,000 ha, 250 Brazil’s forests sequester more carbon
than those of any other nation. 251 Deforestation is rampant in Brazil,
however, and accounts for approximately three-quarters of the country’s
annual carbon emissions. 252 Seventeen percent of the Amazon has already
been lost, 253 and some scientists predict that 55 percent will be destroyed
Scientists and
by 2030 unless “something dramatic” occurs. 254
policymakers have identified an aggressive REDD scheme as the step that
Brazil must take to save its rainforests.255
At the international level, Brazil has been an active participant in
UNFCCC REDD negotiations. At COP-12 in Nairobi (2006), Brazil added
a new proposal to the REDD discourse, suggesting that REDD provide
“positive incentives for voluntary action” to reduce deforestation in
developing countries. 256 Instead of following the proposal put forth by the
Coalition of Rainforest Nations—which would allow Annex I nations to use
REDD as an “offset” option to meet mandatory emissions reductions
targets—Brazil’s proposal advocates a voluntary fund, in which Annex I
nations would make performance-based donations, in addition to meeting

249. See id. at 11–13.
250. Brazil Statistics, MONGABAY, http://rainforests.mongabay.com/deforestation/archive/
Brazil.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
251. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34.
252. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 3; see also Osvaldo Stella Martins et al., Brazil, in
REDD, FOREST GOVERNANCE AND RURAL LIVELIHOODS, supra note 83, at 53, 55 (noting that
key drivers of deforestation in Brazil are agribusiness—including grain production and
conversion of forests to pastureland—cattle ranching, timber extraction and mining); Rhett
A.
Butler,
Big
REDD,
WASH.
MONTHLY
(July–Aug.
2009),
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2009/0907.butler.html
(explaining
that
deforestation in Brazil peaked between 1997 and 2004 at 10,600 square miles per year, an
area the size of Massachusetts).
253. See The Juma Sustainable Development Reserve Project: Reducing Greenhouse
Gas Emissions for Deforestation in the State of Amazonas, Brazil, 5 (May 7, 2008),
http://www.climate-standards.org/projects/files/pdd_juma_project_v_3_0.pdf
[hereinafter
Juma PDD].
254. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34.
255. See id.
256. See 12th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 6–17, 2006, Submission from Brazil, add. 5, U.N.
DOC FCCC/CP/2006/5/Add. (Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil Submission].

2011]

THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK

853

their mandatory targets, to reward developing countries that have reduced
deforestation. 257
Domestically, Brazil has implemented sixteen voluntary REDD programs
as of 2009, 258 and has been developing a legal framework for REDD.259
Brazil faces two primary challenges with its internal REDD initiation.
First, because it is a federation, Brazil must be aware of the interplay
between national and state forestry laws. 260 Additionally, Brazil must
navigate a complex system of land rights that uses both customary and
statutory law. 261 Because of these challenges—and the diverse solutions
Brazil is testing in its pilot projects—Brazil’s legal framework presents an
interesting study of how to implement REDD regulations and rewards
across a multi-layered nation.
1. Forest Governance in a Federation
Brazil looks to a number of policies, regulations, and laws—both at the
national and state level—to establish the legal basis for REDD initiation.262
Brazil has used federalism to its benefit while implementing REDD pilot
projects, allowing for varied policies to be tested under differing state
laws. 263 Even so, as Brazil prepares for a binding international REDD
agreement, it faces the difficulty of managing a “complex mix of federal
and state laws on climate and forestry” which complicate REDD
application. 264 This section outlines the national and local regulations that
create the legal framework for Brazil’s REDD programs.
At the national level, Brazil’s government has not enacted any legislation
to govern REDD activities specifically. 265 Instead, the government looks to
existing forestry laws to regulate REDD. The most prominant of these laws
is the Federal Constitution of Brazil, which recognizes the importance of
cohesion between the multiple levels of government, especially in regards
to climate conservation.266 The Constitution emphasizes that both the
national government and local communities have a duty to preserve the
257. See id.; see also CHARLIE PARKER ET AL., THE LITTLE REDD+ BOOK 38 (2009)
(highlighting how Brazil’s UNFCCC proposal differs from other national REDD proposals);
Streck, supra note 115, at 11–12, 15 (describing Brazil and Costa Rica’s financial
proposals).
258. See Marie Calmel et al., REDD at Project Scale+: Evaluation and Development
Guide, ONF INT’L, 25 (2009), http://www.onfinternational.org/images/stories/information/
publications/guide_redd_eng.pdf.
259. Émilie Champagne & Josh Roberts, Case Study: Brazil, in LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR
REDD, supra note 17, at 125, 125.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. at 126. See generally S. Schwartzman, Brazil National and State REDD
Report, ENVTL. DEF. FUND (Nov. 2009), http://www.edf.org/sites/default/files/
10438_Brazil_national_and_state_REDD_report.pdf (discussing the national and state laws
that must coexist for a successful REDD regime in Brazil).
263. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126.
264. See Costenbader, supra note 73, at 14.
265. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126.
266. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 23 (Braz.), available at
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html.
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environment. 267 It is the responsibility of the “Union, the States, the
Federal District and the municipalities to . . . protect the environment and
fight pollution in any of its forms [and] to preserve the forests, fauna, and
flora.” 268
Building on the general duties outlined in the Constitution, Brazil’s
national government has introduced two overarching plans to fight climate
change and deforestation: The National Plan to Combat Deforestation and
Plan to Combat Deforestation at State Level for the Period 2008–2011269
(Deforestation Plan) and the National Plan on Climate Change 270 (National
Plan).
The National Plan presents Brazil’s strategy for curbing climate change,
setting the nation’s first deforestation reduction target, which uses a series
of reduction goals to ultimately cut deforestation 70 percent by 2018.271
The National Plan envisions using forest monitoring and protection
mechanisms, combined with an incentives program, to halt deforestation.272
Thus, while its goal is to reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the
National Plan does not use traditional REDD methodologies, such as
generating carbon credits, in order to do so.273 Specific measures call for
sanctions on illegal logging, a forest restoration program, and the
establishment of a National Public Forests Register to keep track of the
protection and management of public forests. In addition, the National Plan
advocates the use of a satellite to monitor deforestation in the Amazon. 274
The Deforestation Plan delineates both national and state level plans to
enhance environmental law enforcement and improve land-titling
procedures in the Amazon Basin. 275 The Deforestation Plan enacts a
number of measures to combat deforestation, including improved forest
monitoring and management, and setting aside 20 million ha as
267. Id. art. 20.
268. Id. art. 23.
269. Decreto No. 6.321, de 3 Novembro 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
12.2008 (Braz.); see also SCHWARTZMAN, supra note 262, at 1 (noting that the Deforestation
Plan is an updated version of a high profile law from 2003, entitled the “Action Plan”).
270. Decreto No. 6.263, de 3 Novembro 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
12.2008 (Braz.).
271. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126; see also Pedro Piris-Cabezas &
Ruben Lubowski, The Brazilian National Plan on Climate Change: Potential Impacts in a
US Cap-and-Trade System, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, 1 (Nov. 29, 2009), http://cleartheair.edf.org/
documents/10563_Brazilian_national_plan_on_climate_change.pdf (noting that the National
Plan calls for a phased approach to emissions reductions, with deforestation being reduced
40 percent from 2006–09, and then decrease by another 30 percent every four years until
2017, at which point emissions will have been reduced 71 percent below then 1996–2005
national reference level).
272. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 126.
273. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34; cf. Brazil’s Climate Change Plan ‘Ready for
Public Scrutiny,’ GUARDIAN (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/
oct/08/network.conservation (noting that emissions reductions targets will be met by
promotion of sustainable agriculture practices).
274. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49.
275. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 50–51
(noting that while the Deforestation Plan aimed to address deforestation at its roots, the
success of the program has yet to be felt in the Amazon).
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conservation units. 276 In addition, the Deforestation Plan specifically
emphasizes the importance of decentralized forest management, with
partnerships between federal, state, and local governments “and the
establishment of a legal framework for public forest management.” 277
In addition to these two prominent plans, Brazil has adopted Federal Law
11.284 on the Management of Public Forests.278 This law promises an
allocation of land and resources to be managed by local communities,
discussed in further detail in Part II.A.3, which addresses Brazil’s land
ownership laws. In addition, the law states that it is forbidden to develop a
forestry plan that “commercializ[es] credits derived from avoided emissions
of carbon in existing forests.” 279 Despite this provision, the Federal law
reserves for the states the right to use a commercial carbon market, which is
also consistent with Brazil’s international REDD position. 280
At the sub-national level, the State of Amazonas has been most active in
passing climate change laws. In 2007, the Law for the State Policy for
Climate Change was the first state-level climate change law to be passed in
This law created a climate change fund “to pay for
Brazil. 281
environmental products and services, including those provided by forest
peoples preserving their environment and reducing deforestation,” and
established financial incentives for conservation projects in Amazonas.282
Departing from the national stance, the Amazonas state law specifically
supports endeavors by the private sector to use market principles in order to
offset their emissions. 283 The law gives clear guidelines for how REDD
project benefits should be distributed, along with mandating measurements
of carbon, protection of forest biodiversity, and baseline levels of GHG
emissions from various economic sectors. 284 As indicated by the
Amazonas state law, the state and national governments in Brazil differ
regarding their approaches to financing REDD. Part II.A.2. addresses the
financing proposal put forward by Brazil’s national government.
2. Brazil’s Plan for Fund-Based Financing
The Brazilian national government bluntly opposed any REDD scheme
that would be linked to the carbon market, and has “repeatedly rejected
REDD policies and projects that would offset emissions from industrialized

276. See id.
277. See id. at 51.
278. Decreto No. 11.284, de 2 de Março 2006, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
3.3.2006 (Braz.); see also Brazil Public Forest Management Law of 2006, USDA FOREIGN
AGRICULTURAL SERVICE GAIN REPORT (Apr. 11, 2006), www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/
200605/146197843.pdf.
279. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 53.
280. See id.
281. Lei no. 3.135, de 4 de Junho de 2007, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DO ESTADO DO AMAZONAS
[D.O.A.].
282. Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129.
283. See id.
284. Id.
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. . . countries.” 285 Instead of supporting market-based financing for REDD,
where credits generated from forest conservation would be traded between
countries, Brazil advocates the establishment of a voluntary REDD fund
that would be filled with donations from industrialized countries.286 This
fund would be completely independent of mandatory emissions reductions
targets, so Annex I nations could not use their donations to offset emission
reduction obligations under a binding climate treaty. 287 The Environment
Minister of Brazil issued a public statement announcing that “[f]or Brazil,
the efforts made by Developing Countries in order to mitigate climate
change through the forest sector need to be additional to the efforts
provided by Developed Countries to reduce its emissions.”288
Brazil has created the Amazon Fund to encourage reforestation and other
Brazil envisions that the
sustainable activities in the Amazon. 289
international community will make payments into the fund based on
“demonstrable reductions in emissions from deforestation in the previous
year against a national reference baseline.”290 Thus far, Brazil’s federal
government has pledged $500 million for the fund, 291 and the Government
of Norway has committed $1 billion, to be paid from 2008 to 2015. 292
Brazil hopes that the fund will generate close to $21 billion to help combat
deforestation in the Amazon. 293
The Amazon Fund is managed by the Brazilian Development Bank
(BNDES), and stakeholders include representatives from BNDES as well as
local and national government agencies, indigenous groups, and civil
society. 294 The Fund will issue grants for forest conservation projects,
contingent upon the project’s fulfillment of five general criteria. To be
eligible for funding, a project must promote the sustainable use of forests,
provide for land tenure and territory planning, respect public forests and
protected areas, stimulate the conservation and sustainable use of
biodiversity, and aid in the recovery of deforested areas.295 As of
285. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 7.
286. See Butler, supra note 102.
287. Id.
288. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49 (quoting Marina Silver, the Brazilian Minister of
the Environment, speaking at the Midnight Sun Dialogue on Climate Change in Sweden,
June 11–14, 2008).
289. See, e.g., As the Amazon Goes, So Goes the Planet, AMAZON FUND,
http://www.amazonfund.org/index.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2011); see also Takacs, supra
note 186, at 34.
290. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49.
291. See id.
292. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 34; see also Daniel Nepstad et al., The End of
Deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon, 326 SCIENCE 1350, 1350–51 (2009) (noting that the
significant international contributions to the Amazon Fund create a big opportunity for
Brazil to end deforestation practices in the Amazon).
293. See Joshua Goodman, Brazil Creates $21 Billion Fund to Slow Amazon
Deforestation, BLOOMBERG ONLINE (Aug. 1 2008, 4:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid =ahDbiZfuCxZI&refer=latin_america.
294. See Griffiths, supra note 10, at 49.
295. See generally SIMON ZADEK ET AL., THE AMAZON FUND: RADICAL SIMPLICITY AND
BOLD
AMBITION
(Avina,
Working
Paper,
2010),
available
at
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November 2010, eight projects, worth a total of $60 million, have been
approved for Amazon funding. 296
While Brazil’s international and national stance has been adamantly
against the carbon market, at the state level, new climate change laws
support the use of linking REDD with carbon credits. 297 The State of
Amazonas takes full advantage of the provision in the Federal Law on the
Management of Public Forests, which preserves the states’ right to utilize
the carbon market. 298 The Law for the State Policy for Climate Change in
Amazonas promotes the use of market instruments in REDD schemes.299
However, the Amazonas Law also includes a state climate change fund to
pay for environmental services, such as avoiding deforestation.300
3. Ownership of Forests and Forest Carbon
The Brazilian national government does not currently recognize specific
property rights in carbon. It is generally “presumed (but not legally
explicit) that whoever owns the rights to use the land above ground would
also have rights to the carbon.” 301 While the government discourages
carbon trading on national land, it does allow for carbon market projects on
state and privately owned land. 302 Thus, one of Brazil’s biggest difficulties
in establishing a clear legal framework for REDD is to overcome the
“complex layers of regulation and uncertainty over land ownership in the
Amazon [that] pose great challenges for the implementation of future
REDD projects in Brazil.” 303
Brazil’s Constitution guarantees the right to property, and establishes that
private land ownership is permitted. 304 Brazil does not have a central land
register, however, making it difficult for Brazilians to claim land
formally. 305 Thus, only an estimated four percent of private land in
Amazonia is covered by secure title.306 In an effort to clarify land
ownership, the national government has enacted a new law to “regularize”
land holdings of up to 1,500 ha. 307 Federal Law 11.925, adopted in 2009,
allows squatters to become regularized occupants of public lands located in
http://www.brazilworks.org/files/Amazon-Fund_Radical-Simplicity-and-Bold-Ambition_
Working-Paper_November2010.pdf.
296. See id. at 12.
297. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 129.
301. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35. See generally THIAGO CHAGAS, FOREST CARBON
RIGHTS IN BRAZIL (2010) (noting that, absent specific property rights in carbon, REDD
programs in Brazil cannot guarantee protection of indigenous property rights).
302. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35.
303. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 125.
304. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5 (Braz.), available at
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html.
305. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127.
306. See id.
307. Lei No. 11.925, de 17 de Abril de 2009, DIÁRIO ORICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
4.17.2009 (Braz.).
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rural Brazil. 308 The government will donate plots of up to 100 ha (247
acres) to land occupants who meet a number of requirements, including that
the land occupation began prior to December 1, 2004; occupants use the
land for agriculture; and occupants hold the land for at least three years
before selling it. 309
Although the law aims to “encourage . . . occupants to stay and improve
their land instead of abandoning it and moving on to clear the next patch of
virgin forest,” it has been criticized for potentially stimulating land
grabbing. 310 “[B]y making it easier to get secure title for dubious land
claims,” the law may prompt a demand for land and encourage squatting in
the hopes that it might lead to de facto ownership. 311 In addition, the law’s
productive use requirements have been denounced because they encourage
deforestation practices, causing critics to worry that even if the law clarifies
land title, it may do so at the expense of the forest.312
On private land, a landowner has the power to decide when to grant
concessions, and a landowner’s permission is required before anyone else
can use natural resources. 313 However, all rural properties are subject to
two governmental limitations that are codified in the Brazilian Forestry
Code. 314 First, Permanent Preservation Areas may be demarcated on either
public or private land that has important environmental functions.315
Second, owners of forestland must designate 80 percent of their plot as a
Reserva Legal (Legal Reserve), which can only be improved after the
government authorizes a sustainable management plan.316
Public lands are administered in accordance with the Law on the
Management of Public Lands, which designates that the Union, states, or
municipalities must allocate concessions on the land “in the interest of the
common good.” 317 The law guarantees that certain areas of the forest must
be managed by local communities.
According to the Brazilian Constitution, all indigenous land is technically
the property of the federal government; however, Article 231 recognizes
that indigenous groups have a right to “permanent possession” of the land
that they traditionally occupy, and have “exclusive rights over the riches of

308. Id.
309. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 20 (noting that the Brazilian government
will also sell larger plots of land (i.e., between 100–400 ha) for a reduced price, provided
that the same criteria are met).
310. The Brazilian Amazon: Preventing Pillage in the Rainforest, ECONOMIST, Feb. 26,
2009, at 39.
311. Id.
312. See Savaresi & Morgera, supra note 172, at 20.
313. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 130–31.
314. Lei No. 4.771, de 15 de Setembro de 1965, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de
16.9.1965 (Braz.).
315. See id.; see also Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127–28.
316. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 127–28.
317. See id.
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the soil, the rivers and the lakes existing therein.”318 In order to ensure that
its land rights are protected, an indigenous group must apply to be formally
recognized by the Fundaçao Nacional do Indio (FUNAI). 319 Once the
recognition process is complete, the indigenous group has the “exclusive
right to use all the goods on the land, even though the land itself continues
to belong to the state.” 320 In this manner, indigenous property rights
become an usufruct right, allowing an indigenous group to use the “natural
wealth of their lands to sustain them and preserve their cultural identity.” 321
Alternatively, indigenous groups can apply to have their lands be
designated as national reserves or protected areas. 322 To do so, an
indigenous group would again submit an application to FUNAI, which
would then perform an anthropological study and issue a statement to the
Justice Department, recommending whether or not the claim should be
accepted. 323 If the recommendation is positive, the Justice Department will
order the demarcation of a reserve, thereby granting formal legal protection
to the indigenous group. 324 Currently, “indigenous reserves comprise about
20% of the Brazilian Amazon, and . . . are, on average, much better
conserved than those outside of reserves and protected areas.”325
4. Benefit Distribution
At the national level, there is no legal framework for benefit sharing in
REDD projects. 326 State level REDD programs, however, have utilized
Payments for Environmental Services (PES) as a way to reward forestdwellers for not cutting down their trees. 327 PES is a voluntary transaction
wherein a well-defined environmental service is purchased by a buyer from

318. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 231 (Braz.), available at
http://www.v-brazil.com/government/laws/constitution.html (recognizing that indigenous
peoples have customary ownership rights on Brazilian lands and natural resources).
319. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35; see also Tom Gibb, Brazil Authorizes Indian
Reserve, BBC (Apr. 15, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4450755.stm (reporting
that Brazil set aside an area of 17,000 square kilometers as an indigenous reserve).
320. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 35.
321. Id.; see also Natalie Unterstell, Brazil: Maintaining the Resilience of Indigenous
Territories, in REALISING RIGHTS, PROTECTING FORESTS: AN ALTERNATIVE VISION FOR
REDUCING
DEFORESTATION
22,
22–25
(2010),
available
at
http://www.rainforestfoundationuk.org/files/Accra_Report_English.pdf (noting that the
existence of indigenous territories, by their very nature, lowers deforestation rates because
the lands are treated as traditional nature reserves).
322. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 37.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. Id. See generally COTULA, supra note 180 (supporting customary tenure rights for
indigenous groups because they best protect rights and the environment).
326. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 50.
327. See, e.g., Sheila Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., Reducing Forest Emissions in the
Amazon Basin: A Review of Drivers of Land-Use Change and How Payments for
Environmental Services (PES) Schemes Can Affect Them 11–13 (Ctr. for Int’l Forestry
Research, Working Paper No. 40, 2008), available at http://www.cifor.org/publications/
pdf_files/WPapers/WP41Wertz-Kanounnikoff.pdf (noting that PES-REDD schemes have
generally been successful in Latin America, but have not worked as well in other regions).
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a provider, if the provider agrees to safeguard the service. 328 PES programs
are different from typical command-and-control environmental regulations
because they are both voluntary and conditional. 329 Thus, in the REDD
context, payments only occur after participants agree to avoid deforestation
and after some sort of verification takes place. 330
In Brazil, the most widely publicized PES-REDD program is the Bolsa
Floresta Forest Conservation Grant Program (Bolsa Floresta), which was
created under the Amazonas State Law for Climate Change. Bolsa Floresta
was established to pay forest-dwelling communities for their role in forest
protection, and its primary objectives are to avoid deforestation and
improve the livelihood of indigenous communities. The program thus
rewards indigenous communities who have demonstrated a commitment to
avoid deforestation. 331
Implemented in September 2007, Bolsa Floresta is managed and financed
by the Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (FAS), the public Secretariat for
Environmental and Sustainable Development, and Bradesco, which is the
largest private bank in Brazil. 332 The FAS received an initial endowment
fund of approximately $23 million, from both governmental and private
investors. 333 In addition, the Marriott International Hotel Chain has agreed
to provide funding, with an initial deposit of $2 million. 334 To receive
funds, Bolsa Floresta participants must: (1) have lived on the State
Conservation Unit for at least two years; (2) keep crop and pasture areas not
larger than those of the year the Forest Conservation Grant Program was
instituted; (3) be registered and regularly attend the school, if the families
have children; (4) participate in a Community Dwellers Association; (5)
participate in the construction and implementation of the Conservation
Units and Management Plan, and (6) participate in an introductory
workshop and sign an Zero Deforestation Agreement. 335 Importantly, land
ownership is not a requirement. 336
As of November 2008, Bolsa Floresta covered six reserves or protected
areas in Brazil, and made payments to 2,102 families in Amazonas state.337
One of the largest REDD projects that utilizes Bolsa Floresta is the Juma
328. Sven Wunder, Payments for Environmental Services: Some Nuts and Bolts 3–4
(Ctr. for Int’l Forestry Research, Working Paper No. 42, 2005), available at
http://www.cifor.org/publications/pdf_files/OccPapers/OP-42.pdf (recognizing that it is hard
to find examples of “true PES,” as many PES schemes are not actually conditional, but
instead issue payments in advance based on flexible contracts).
329. See id. at 6 (noting that while they offer a stark contrast to command-and-control
mechanisms, PES systems can exist with traditional rigid regulations).
330. See IVAN BOND ET AL., INCENTIVES TO SUSTAIN FOREST ECOSYSTEM SERVICES: A
REVIEW AND LESSONS FOR REDD 5–6 (2009).
331. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 13 (explaining how payments are
issued to individuals and communities that volunteer to halt deforestation practices).
332. Id. at 11.
333. See Juma PDD, supra note 253, at 47.
334. See id.
335. See Champagne & Roberts, supra note 259, at 133 (noting that these requirements
are a part of Brazilian Decree no. 26.958/2007).
336. Id.
337. Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 11.
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Sustainable Development Reserve Project for Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions from Deforestation 338 (Juma Project). The Juma Project was the
first project to receive Gold Level Certification from the CCB Standards,
which estimate that “Juma’s REDD scheme will prevent an estimated 3.6
million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions . . . over the first crediting
period, from 2006 to 2016. By the project’s end in 2050, it is expected to
have generated about 190 million tonnes of CO 2 e credits.” 339
In addition to these economic benefits, Juma provides payments to
indigenous families. 340 The majority of the families living in the Juma
Reserve do not have formal land titles or personal documentation, yet they
are remunerated to protect the rainforest by receiving roughly $30 per
month, which is issued to the female head of each household. 341 Before
they receive payment, families must take a two-day training course that
teaches about sustainable land use management. 342 Then each family signs
a contract, binding them not to cut or burn the trees, which will be
supervised by regular inspections. In the event of deforestation, the FAS
will stop issuing payments. 343
In addition to paying families, Bolsa Floresta issues payments to family
associations, community groups, and social programs. Family associations
receive a “cash grant averaging $500/month per association plus in-kind
grant of equipment (such as boat or internet connection).”344 Community
Associations receive $2,500 per year, and social programs are granted
approximately $70,000 per year, in the “form of small investments (for
example, in education or health) complementing state and local government
programmes.” 345 Because the Bolsa Floresta program is relatively new,
many of its effects have not been measured or studied. Although Bolsta
Floresta has received the CCBA’s Gold Standard designation, it remains to
be seen whether the program could be replicated in other parts of the world.
In general, Brazil has successfully incorporated REDD policies into its
pre-existing national legal frameworks. In addition to national laws that
protect indigenous customary property rights, Brazil has state laws that
have allowed for great variation among REDD pilot projects. The most
338. See generally Juma PDD, supra note 253.
339. Virgilio M. Viana et al., The Costs of REDD: Lessons from Amazonas, INT’L INST.
FOR ENV’T & DEV., 2 (Nov. 2009), http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17076IIED.pdf.
340. See Juma PDD, supra note 253, at 80 (noting that by directing funds towards the
female head of each household, the Juma Project aims to combat gender inequality, as well
as indigenous inequality).
341. See Wertz-Kanounnikoff et al., supra note 327, at 11.
342. See id.
343. See id. at 12–14; see also Brazil: Juma Test Case in the Amazon, WORLD
RAINFOREST MOVEMENT, http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/155/Brazil.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2011) (noting that some indigenous groups have argued that the Juma Reserve’s monthly
payment is not enough to compensate for the loss of livelihood that indigenous groups
experience when they stop deforestation practices).
344. Viana, supra note 339, at 2 (noting that the Juma Reserve Project was the first
voluntary REDD project to receive the Gold Standard designation from the CCBA, in large
part because of the Project’s active efforts to fund families and community groups).
345. Id.

862

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

successful of these projects is the Juma Reserve project, funded by Bolsa
Floresta, in the State of Amazonas. Indigenous groups have been
compensated for their REDD contributions, regardless of whether they have
statutory land rights.
B. Indonesia
This Note will now explore how REDD interacts with indigenous rights
in another nation with extreme deforestation, Indonesia. With between 90
and 100 million ha of forestland inside its borders, Indonesia is the third
most heavily forested nation in the world, after Brazil and the Democratic
Republic of Congo. 346 Indonesia’s forests sequester approximately 3.5
billion tons of carbon347 and provide livelihood to at least 20 million
people. 348 Even so, deforestation occurs at alarming rates, as timber
concessions, fires, roads, and mining all threaten Indonesia’s forests. Exact
statistics regarding deforestation in Indonesia are inconsistent; Indonesia’s
Ministry of Forestry estimates that the country lost 2.83 million ha of forest
per year to deforestation between 1997 and 2000, 349 while the FAO
estimates that Indonesia’s annual deforestation rate was 1.87 million ha for
the same period. 350 Further complicating Indonesia’s deforestation data,
the World Bank approximates that 28 percent of the country’s public
forestland is actually devoid of trees.351
Regardless of statistical discrepancies, it is widely agreed that
Indonesia’s forests are in grave danger. 352 Recognizing that REDD can be
economically and environmentally beneficial, Indonesia’s government has
acted at both the global and local levels to ensure that REDD becomes a
reality. Internationally, Indonesia and Australia have entered into a bilateral

346. See Christopher Barr et al., Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia:
An Overview, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA 1, 2
(Christopher Barr et al. ed., 2006); see also Indonesia’s Forests in Brief, GLOBAL FOREST
WATCH, http://www.globalforestwatch.org/english/indonesia/forests.htm (last visited Oct.
20, 2011) (noting that Indonesia currently has approximately 98 million ha of forestland,
down from 162 million ha in 1950).
347. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46.
348. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 3 (highlighting that 20 million is a conservative
estimate).
349. See United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan, Oct. 18–29,
2010, Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports ¶ 3(g),
UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/2 (Oct. 22, 2010); see also Fitrian Ardiansyah, National
Institutional Arrangements for REDD Case Study: Indonesia (as of December 2009),
WORLD WIDE FORESTS, 2 (Dec. 2009), http://www.theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/
resources/pdf/2010/report_7_indonesia.pdf.
350. See State of the World’s Forests 2007, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0773e/a0773e00.HTM (last visited Oct. 20,
2011).
351. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46.
352. See generally REDD in Indonesia: An Independent Monitoring Report by Forest
Watch
Indonesia
(2009),
http://vh-gfc.dpi.nl/img/userpics/File/REDD/REDD-inIndonesia.pdf.

2011]

THE “RIGHT” REDD FRAMEWORK

863

REDD alliance. 353 The Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon Partnership
(IAFCP) was the first developed-developing country partnership to submit a
joint proposal to the UNFCCC, 354 and together the two countries have
implemented a number of REDD pilot projects in Indonesia that are
discussed further in Part II.B.4. Domestically, Indonesia is home to
approximately twenty voluntary REDD pilot programs. 355 Each REDD
project uses different rules and regulations, and may be sponsored by
NGOs, corporations, or governments. 356 In an effort to unify Indonesia’s
REDD projects, the national government recently passed legislation
specifically related to REDD implementation, making it the first—and
only—country in the world to do so. 357
Indonesia is an important case study because of its unique national
REDD legislation. Implemented amidst an intense political power struggle
between the central and provincial governments, Indonesia’s national
REDD Law has the potential to clarify the country’s REDD regime, but
may also limit indigenous rights and participation. 358 In recent history,
Indonesia’s administrative authority has shifted back and forth between
national and local governments. 359 This section explains the effect that
decentralization—and recentralization—has had on indigenous rights in
REDD, specifically elaborating on how the laws regarding REDD
financing, carbon property rights, and REDD benefit distribution have
changed in light of the governmental power shift.
1. Indonesia’s Governmental Power Struggle
Indonesia’s national government has historically exercised primary
control over the country’s forestry practices.360 After the collapse of the
Soeharto New Order regime, 361 however, government restructuring caused
353. See IAFCP Factsheet, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY
(Dec.
2009),
www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/pdf/IAFCP_factsheet_2_
11Dec09.pdf.
354. See id.
355. See Adianto P. Simamora, Government Delays Awarding Permits for REDD
Projects, JAKARTA POST (Feb. 7, 2009), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/07/
government-delays-awarding-permits-redd-projects.html.
356. See Beth Askham, REDD Pilot Projects in Indonesia, ECOS ONLINE MAG. (Dec. 10,
2010), http://ecosmagazine.com/paper/EC10048.htm.
357. P.30/Menhut-II/2009 [Regulation on Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and
Forest Degradation Procedure], May 1, 2009; see also Background Analysis of REDD
Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 11.
358. See generally Moira Moeliono & Ahmad Dermawan, The Impacts of
Decentralization on Forests and Livelihood, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST
ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 346, at 108 (explaining that indigenous groups
have more opportunities to participate in local decision-making).
359. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1–3.
360. See id. at 1.
361. Soeharto was the authoritarian leader of Indonesia from 1966 to 1998. His
government, called the New Order regime, was highly centralized, reserving most of the
nation’s power for the President. For further information on the Soeharto regime, see
RETNOWATI ABDULGANI-KNAPP, SOEHARTO: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF INDONESIA’S SECOND
PRESIDENT (2007) and R.E. ELSON, SUHARTO: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY (2009).
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administrative power to be reallocated to district and local governments.362
This process of decentralization occurred in all aspects of Indonesian law,
but had a particularly dramatic impact on the forestry sector, as forestdwelling communities reestablished control over forestland.363 Recently
there has been a backlash against decentralization. As indicated by the new
national REDD legislation, the power pendulum is swinging back towards
the central government. 364 This section compares Indonesia’s forestry laws
under decentralized and recentralized regimes, emphasizing how well
indigenous rights have been upheld under each.
a. Decentralization and Deforestation
Indonesia’s central government took control of the forestry sector in the
early twentieth century; as colonization came to an end, and the Ministry of
Forestry began nationalizing forestland that was once privately owned by
foreigners. 365 When Soeharto’s New Order regime gained power in 1966,
the national government enacted legislation that gave it almost absolute
control over Indonesia’s forestry practices. 366 Under Indonesia’s Basic
Forestry Law of 1967, for example, the government classified over 143
million ha of forest as public land, disregarding customary land claims and
giving the central government sweeping power over approximately onethird of the nation’s total forested area. 367
The central government’s control led to a “forestry crisis” in
Indonesia. 368 Through the Basic Forestry Law, the Ministry of Forestry
granted commercial timber concessions on over 60 million ha of the stateThe central government benefitted from the
controlled land. 369
concessions, as both private and state owned timber companies were
required to pay fees and royalties directly to the national government,

362. See, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1–3; see also Tony Djogo & Rudi Syaf,
Decentralization without Accountability:
Power and Authority over Local Forest
Governance in Indonesia (2004), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/
10535/1611/Djogo_Decentralization_040308_Paper565a.pdf.
363. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 2.
364. Christopher Barr et al., Decentralization’s Effects on Forest Concessions and Timber
Production, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note
346, at 87, 103.
365. See Country Overview: Indonesia, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE NATIONS (Timothy L.
Gall
&
Jeneen
M.
Hobby
eds.,
12th
ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Indonesia.html.
366. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1.
367. See Undang-undang Pokok-pokok Kehutanan 5/1967 [Basic Forestry Law], May
1967; see also Takacs, supra note 186, at 47 (noting that the central government possessed
the decision-making powers to determine which areas should be classified as forest, and to
determine commercial licensing and utilization of forest products).
368. Christopher Barr, Forest Administration and Forestry Sector Development Prior to
1998, in DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 346, at
18, 28.
369. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1.
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bypassing district governments and local communities. 370 As a result of
these forestry practices, by 1978 half of the world’s timber was exported
from Indonesia, 371 and from 1985 to 1999 an estimated 1.6 million ha of
Indonesia’s forest cover was lost each year due to deforestation or forest
degradation. 372
After thirty-two years in power, the Soeharto regime collapsed in May of
1998, leading to “intense political struggles” between Indonesia’s national,
provincial, and district governments.373 As separatist movements sprouted
up across the country—especially in resource-rich regions, such as Aceh,
Papua, and East Timor—Indonesia’s post-Soeharto leaders recognized that
“autonomy for . . . regional governments [was] an unavoidable tradeoff for
maintaining Indonesia’s status as a unitary republic.”374 Thus, from 1999
to 2002, the central government enacted legislation to transfer
administrative authority from the national government to local leaders in an
effort to balance power and “maintain Indonesia’s integrity as a nation.”375
The most significant enactments—Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance
and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal Balancing between the Central Government and
Regional Governments—did not pertain specifically to forestry; however,
by forming the foundation of Indonesia’s decentralization movement, both
laws dramatically impacted the forestry sector.376
In addition, the Basic Forestry Law of 1999 was enacted, replacing the
1967 Law. 377 The 1999 Law pledged to create a decentralized forest
regime that would “accommodate the dynamic of community aspirations
and participation, customary and cultural, and social values.”378 District
governments eagerly took advantage of the opportunity to control the
natural resources within their jurisdictions, and forest-dwelling peoples
began to reestablish ownership over land that was under State control
during the New Order period. 379 After thirty-two years under a centralized
regime, district and local actors generally felt it was their turn to benefit
from forest resources. 380 This feeling of entitlement did not manifest itself
370. See Barr, supra note 368, at 24 (explaining how funds were allocated between the
central and local governments, with taxes and earmarks that went directly to the central
government).
371. See Country Overview: Indonesia, supra note 365.
372. See Barr, supra note 368, at 28.
373. See id. at 31.
374. See id.
375. See id. at 10.
376. See id.; see also Takacs, supra note 186, at 47 (noting that Indonesia’s Law 22/1999
and Regulation 25/2000 delineate the division of powers between central and local
governments, reserving the following decision-making powers for the central government:
determining what areas will be classified as forest, setting tariffs and fees for forest
resources, allocating commercial permits, and designing criteria for licensing in forests).
377. See Undang-undang tentang Kehutanan 41/1999 [Law on Forestry], Sept. 1999,
available at http://www.bkpm.go.id/file_uploaded/Law_4199.htm.
378. Id.; see infra Part II.B.2.
379. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 2 (noting that indigenous communities felt they
had been robbed of their land entitlements under the Soeharto regime, and thus believed they
were reestablishing ownership over land that was rightfully theirs).
380. See id.
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in forest conservation efforts, however.
Local governments and
communities simply began granting concessions to—and receiving benefits
from—small-scale timber companies, rather than implementing practices
that would protect the forests. 381
b. Recentralization and REDD
After three years of extensive decentralization, the central government
attempted to regain control of the forestry sector. The Ministry of Forestry
claimed that decentralization had “highly damaging” effects on Indonesia’s
forests. 382 Referencing the Constitution, which states that forests must be
managed by the national government to provide sustainable benefits to all
Indonesians, 383 the Ministry of Forestry adopted measures to curtail
decentralization in 2002.384 It is within this context that the Indonesian
Minister of Forestry signed Regulation P.30/2009 on Procedures for
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD
Regulation) in May 2009, enacting the world’s first “national legal regime
for the implementation of REDD projects, and the issuance and trading of
carbon credits in respect of the greenhouse gas reductions such projects
generate.” 385 REDD Regulation grants the national government power over
REDD demonstration activities, monitoring and verification mechanisms,
and carbon sequestration projects. 386
2. Phases of REDD Financing
While it is too soon for effects of REDD Regulation to be analyzed,
many indigenous groups have expressed concern that a centralized legal
framework will prevent forest-dwelling peoples from participating in and
receiving benefits from REDD programs. The remainder of this section
examines the interplay between the new REDD Regulation and existing
Indonesian laws regarding REDD financing, property rights, and benefit
distribution.
Indonesia advocates a phased approach to REDD implementation, both
in its domestic legislation and international REDD proposals. 387 The three
separate stages of Indonesia’s REDD plan—REDD Preparation, REDD
Readiness, and Full Implementation—call for different methods of
financing. 388 Both Preparation and Readiness utilize international REDD
381. See id.
382. See id.
383. 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Aug. 18, 1945, art. 33, available at
http://www.humanrights.asia/countries/indonesia/laws/uud1945_en.
384. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at 1.
385. See Background Analysis of REDD Regulatory Frameworks, supra note 80, at 11.
386. See id. at 12–13.
387. See Nur Masripatin et al., National Strategy: REDD-Indonesia Readiness Phase
2009–2012 and Progress in Implementation, 11 (Feb. 2010), http://www.forda-mof.org/
uploads/2010/buku%20redd%20versi%20english.pdf.
388. Id.; see also Ardiansyah, supra note 349, at 12, 17 (noting that Indonesia has also
submitted proposals to the FCPF and UN-REDD Program, both of which advocate
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funds, while Full Implementation, due to begin in 2012, would be marketbased. In this manner, Indonesia’s REDD programs will be using a hybrid
method of financing. 389
Indonesia’s three-phase REDD approach was developed in conjunction
with Australia, through the IAFCP. 390 The REDD Preparation Phase took
place from 2007 to 2008, as a “quick analysis” on Indonesia’s REDD
preparedness, in terms of technological and political capabilities to
implement REDD. 391 After assessing its REDD capacity, Indonesia moved
into its REDD Readiness phase, referred to as REDDI. 392 This phase is
currently ongoing, as Indonesia focuses on capacity building and
Demonstration Activities from 2009 to 2012. Both of these stages have
been financed from international funds. 393 At the national level, Norway
has pledged $1 billion to Indonesia for Readiness activities. Additionally,
Australia donated $40 million to Indonesia’s REDD fund in 2008, with $30
million going towards the Kalimantan Forests and Climate Partnership, and
$10 million in a general “bilateral package of support for Indonesia on
forests and climate.” 394 To build REDD capacity, this money will be
allocated in three main areas: “policy cooperation under the UNFCCC and
capacity building support; technical support to increase Indonesia’s forest
carbon measurement capacity; and identifying and implementing incentivebased practical REDD activities.” 395
Indonesia hopes to implement market-linked REDD fully by 2012, in
accordance with the expected UNFCCC international legislation. Under its
REDD Law, Indonesia advocates a market-based mechanism that would
generate tradable REDD credits. Hybrid funding works well in Indonesia
because of its weak tenure rights, which will be discussed further in Part
II.B.3. Generally, countries “with weak legal, institutional and governance
structures [are not] in the position to assure long-term compliance with the
requirements of a mandatory market mechanism.” 396 Thus, Indonesia’s
phased approach, with an emphasis on capacity building, is beneficial as the

implementation of REDD in phases in order to build capacity for REDD markets in
developing countries).
389. See Macintosh, supra note 123, at 5 (noting that hybrid-based funding uses a
combination of market-linked REDD and forestry funds).
390. See IAFCP Factsheet, supra note 353; see also Action Under the International
Forest Carbon Initiative, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND ENERGY
EFFICIENCY, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/international-forestcarbon-initiative/action.aspx (last visited Oct. 20, 2011).
391. See Masripatin et al., supra note 387, at 11.
392. See id. at 10–13.
393. See id. at 10.
394. See IAFCP Factsheet, supra note 353 (noting that Australia is planning on donating
an additional $40 million for future REDD pilot projects in Indonesia).
395. Id.
396. Laura Ximena, Why Are We Seeing “REDD”? An Analysis of the International
Debate on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation in Developing
Countries, INSTITUT DU DÉVELOPPEMENT DURABLE ET DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES, 18–
19
(2007),
http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/An_0702_Rubio&
Wertz_REDD.pdf.
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country sorts out its complicated tenure issues before transitioning into
market-based REDD.
3. Ownership of Land and Carbon in Indonesia
As mentioned above, the Basic Forestry Law of 1967 allowed the central
government to convert 143 million ha of Indonesia’s forests to public land,
overriding the customary land rights of indigenous communities who had
been living in the forests for generations. 397 Indigenous groups protested
against forestry practices that gave State interests precedence over
customary rights, changing the legal status of forests from adat, 398 or
customary lands, to State land without informing or receiving consent from
indigenous groups. 399
In part because of indigenous community protests, post-Soeharto leaders
determined that the 1967 Basic Forestry Law was not “compatible” with the
goal of “sustainable forest management . . . able to accommodate the
dynamic of community aspirations and participation, customary and
cultural, and social values in accordance with national norms.” 400 Thus, the
government enacted the Basic Forestry Law of 1999 (Law 41/1999) in
order to replace the 1967 law of the same name. Although its rhetoric
recognizes “customary law communities” and ensures “compensation if
indigenous communities’ traditional areas become designated as national
forest areas,” Law 41/1999 is similar to its predecessor in that it vests
exclusive authority over untitled forestland in the national government,
without any special provision for the ownership rights of indigenous
peoples. 401 Further, Law 41/1999 allows the State to issue concessions
An “official elucidation”
over any forestland at its discretion.402
accompanying Law 41/1999 emphasized the “far-reaching authority” of the
national government:
[T]he Nation gives the [Central] Government authority to organize and
regulate everything associated with forests, the forest estate, and forest
products; to define the forest estate and/or change the status of the forest
estate; to define and regulate legal relationships between people and
forests or the forest estate and forest products; and to control the
formulation of laws related to forestry. Therefore, the [Central]

397. See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
398. See Barr et al., supra note 346, at xiv (defining adat as rights and communities based
in rights that are “customary or traditional, a rich and complex concept touching on law,
tenure, religion, symbolism, practice, and ethnicity”).
399. Indonesian Indigenous Peoples Question New Forestry Law, WORLD RAINFOREST
MOVEMENT, http://www.wrm.org.uy/bulletin/23/Indonesia.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2011)
(stating that, according to the Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago, the 1967
Basic Forestry Law allowed the government to “unilaterally seize[] control of tens of
millions of hectares of customary forest lands which have been handed down . . . , owned,
controlled and managed by . . . Indonesia’s indigenous peoples”).
400. Law on Forestry, supra note 377.
401. See id.
402. Id.
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Government has authority to allocate rights and permits to other parties
to carry out activities in the field of forestry. 403

Despite the absence of national adat recognition, some district
governments have issued decrees recognizing adat forestry rights. 404 The
system is generally marked by a lack of legal clarity, however, undermining
most indigenous peoples’ claims to forestland. Adat lands are “generally
unmapped and not protected by statutory law.” 405 Additionally, the
protection of adat rights has been difficult because outsiders are generally
not aware of—or choose to ignore—adat claims. 406 To have their adat
claims recognized, indigenous groups generally try to reconstruct history.
Although this “contest over time and place” is the most common way to
legitimize adat claims, it is not very effective, as Law 41/1999 does not
allow indigenous groups to gain formal title over land via adverse
possession. 407 Unlike in Brazil, groups cannot acquire title to land by
“improving” a plot of land through farming or other development. 408
Proponents argue that this system removes a major incentive for
deforestation and simplifies the allocation of property rights. Critics, on the
other hand, note that this is potentially harmful to indigenous peoples, since
untitled land will always belong to the State, thus removing any possibility
that the customary land rights of indigenous peoples will be respected. The
United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD) has repeatedly urged Indonesia to review its laws “to ensure that
they respect the rights of indigenous peoples to possess, develop, control
and use their communal lands.” 409 As a result, the new Law has generated
much controversy, and Indonesia’s forestry practices continue to be
criticized by indigenous communities.410
Although adat communities believe that their customary land rights
should be recognized out of principles of equity, they do not necessarily
advocate the best environmental policies. Many indigenous groups want
title to their land so that they can receive benefits from timber
concessions. 411 Current legislation in Indonesia does not recognize a
403. John McCarthy et al., Origins and Scope of Indonesia’s Decentralization Laws, in
DECENTRALIZATION OF FOREST ADMINISTRATION IN INDONESIA, supra note 346, at 33, 44–45,
(emphasis added) (quoting official elucidation of Law 41/1999).
404. Id.
405. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112. See generally Max Gluckman,
Adat Law in Indonesia 31 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 60, 63 (1945).
406. See generally Gamma Galudra et al., Hot Spot of Emission and Confusion: Land
Tenure Insecurity, Contested Policies and Competing Claims in the Central Kalimantan ExMega Rice Project Area (World Agroforestry Ctr., Working Paper No. 98, 2010), available
at http://www.worldagroforestry.org/downloads/publications/PDFs/WP16601.pdf.
407. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112.
408. Id.
409. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination: Indonesia, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/IDN/CO/3 (2007).
410. Indigenous Peoples Question New Forestry Law, supra note 399.
411. Moeliono & Dermawansupra, supra note 358, at 112 (“While adat communities
clearly would like to have rights over their ancestral territories and forest resources formally
recognized under Indonesian law, this does not always mean that such groups are willing and
capable to manage and protect these resources in a sustainable manner . . . many customary
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separate property right in forest carbon, but rather grants carbon ownership
to the owner of forestland. 412 Thus, there is a great opportunity for
incentive-based REDD schemes to reward adat communities for becoming
stewards of the forests, and the carbon stored within them. Because of the
controversy over indigenous tenure rights, however, REDD benefits often
bypass adat groups.
4. Distribution of Benefits
Indonesia’s decentralization movement began in large part because of
local communities’ insistence that they receive an equitable distribution of
forest benefits. 413 As the national government aims to recentralize forestry
practices, including REDD, local groups fear that they will once again be
pushed aside. The national government is currently entitled to take 30
percent of all credits issued in Indonesian REDD projects, in order to
manage its own national and international REDD commitments. 414 This
money is frequently not seen by indigenous communities. The remaining
70 percent of REDD revenue is supposed to be given to regional
governments, who allot some money to a “Reforestation Fund” and
distribute the rest to the community, either via community services or direct
payments. 415 Frequently, the money is tied up as governments spend time
negotiating how the money will be distributed, and local peoples do not see
the benefits. 416
The money that is distributed to local communities is generally in the
form of PES payments. Because decentralization reforms in Indonesia have
led to local communities negotiating with timber companies for logging
agreements, 417 PES distribution seems as though it would be an ideal way
to implement REDD. However, because of weak customary tenure rights
and the persistence of commercial loggers who are willing to pay
indigenous groups who lack formal land title, PES frequently does not work
in Indonesia. 418 Instead of enticing communities to stop logging, PES
entices timber companies to offer more money for deforestation services.
Unintentionally, PES in Indonesia is competing with—and losing to—
industrial scale timber companies.419
communities use adat claims as a strategy to protect forests, many also feel it is easier to sell
exploitation rights for a share in the revenue.”).
412. Takacs, supra note 186, at 46.
413. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
414. See Takacs, supra note 186, at 46 (“Over the past year, Indonesia’s Ministry of
Forestry has developed a series of decrees defining how REDD activities should be carried
out and evaluated [including] . . . Permenhut No 36/2009 [that] . . . regulates REDD projects
with defined revenue sharing allocations for local communities, project developers, and the
different levels of government . . . based on the project and forest type.”).
415. See id. at 47.
416. See id.
417. See generally Stefanie Engel, Payments for Environmental Services as an
Alternative to Logging Under Weak Property Rights: The Case of Indonesia 65
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 799 (2008).
418. See id.
419. See id. at 800.
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Both Brazil and Indonesia face unique struggles as they implement their
national REDD legal frameworks. However, the lessons that can be learned
from both nations’ experiences are universal.
III. REALITIES OF REDD: HOW TO BEST PROTECT INDIGENOUS RIGHTS
IN THE GLOBAL REDD REGIME
Although the majority of REDD research has focused on policy practices
thus far, 420 the legal implications of REDD deserve more scrutiny, as
national laws will directly influence how REDD is practiced on the
ground. 421 As explained in Part I, protection of indigenous rights is crucial
in REDD programs, not only because of international human rights
obligations, but also because REDD will not be successful without the
cooperation of the forest-dwelling peoples who choose whether or not to cut
down trees on a day-to-day basis. 422
Part III begins by addressing the threshold question of whether a national
legal framework is necessary for rights protection in REDD. After
answering that question in the affirmative, Part III then makes specific
recommendations for REDD national legal frameworks, based on Part II’s
comparison of REDD regulation in Brazil and Indonesia.
A. National Legal Frameworks Are Crucial to Rights Protection in REDD
Since REDD reached the forefront of climate change negotiations in
2005, the international community has agreed upon vague REDD
regulations that will govern avoided deforestation projects in the postKyoto protocol commitment period. 423 Although its inclusion in Kyoto’s
successor is regarded as a foregone conclusion, REDD policy remains
uncertain. 424 REDD is currently a clutter of inconsistent pilot projects,
causing its practical realities to vary. One common theme of REDD
programs, however, is that their effects on indigenous communities are
determined by pilot project policies, rather than the obscure language on
safeguards that is found in international agreements.425
At 2010’s COP-16, UNFCCC negotiators seemed to recognize that one
international REDD agreement will not fit all national REDD scenarios, and
emphasized the important role that State laws play in establishing
comprehensive REDD plans. 426 The Cancun Accord encourages each
country that participates in REDD activities to develop national REDD
regulations, emphasizing the need for each State to develop a national
reference level of GHG emissions from deforestation, a national forest
monitoring system to measure changes in forest cover, and national
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safeguards to protect the rights of indigenous peoples. 427 Although the
Cancun Accord’s guidelines for rights safeguards are vague, they seem to
acknowledge the precarious situation that indigenous groups are currently
in as a result of REDD. 428 Because international agreements do not provide
strong language regarding rights protections, indigenous groups are
frequently at the mercy of REDD pilot projects run by private companies
who are not bound by international human rights laws. 429 Currently, most
voluntary REDD projects are contract based, causing indigenous peoples to
be subject to terms and conditions of agreements that they may not
understand.
National governments, on the other hand, are required to respect
international treaty obligations. The right to property can be found in the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which, although non-binding, is a
cornerstone of rights protection and is respected across the globe.430
Additionally, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples specifically mentions that indigenous groups have the rights to
property and the right to “free, prior, and informed consent.” 431 Most of the
world has signed UNDRIP, demonstrating some level of respect for
indigenous rights. Further, ILO Convention 169 promotes the indigenous
right to self-determination. 432 Although only ratified by twenty nations,
ILO 169 is an influential document that impacts the way governments—not
private companies—treat indigenous groups. Because their fundamental
rights are best protected by national governments with treaty obligations,
indigenous groups are best served by national REDD frameworks that turn
the principles of human rights documents into practice. 433
In addition, the lives of indigenous peoples are more directly impacted by
national laws than by international agreements. 434 As evidenced by the
discussion of Brazil and Indonesia, national decrees impact the property
rights and benefit disbursement that accompany REDD programs.435
Regardless of the text of international agreements, these specific national
laws change the way forestry practices occur on the ground. Indigenous
peoples are subject to national law enforcement and national benefit sharing
arrangements. Thus, it is through domestic legal frameworks that true
rights safeguards can be implemented, as the domestic laws will have more
of an effect on the day-to-day lives of forest-dwelling peoples.
Further, indigenous groups’ opportunities for participation in REDD
schemes is greater at the national level than it is at the international level.
The smaller the scale of REDD programs, the more likely indigenous
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peoples’ voices will be heard during planning and design stages. 436 Given
this greater opportunity for free, prior, and informed consent, indigenous
rights will inherently be better protected than they would absent national
REDD legislation. Bolivia, for example, protested the vague rights
language in both the Copenhagen and Cancun Accords. 437 By developing a
domestic REDD framework, however, Bolivia can implement tough laws to
uphold indigenous freedoms.
Overall, international REDD agreements do not adequately protect
indigenous rights because they use weak language and do not allow for
sufficient indigenous participation at the negotiation level. 438 Project-level
REDD contracts also cannot offer rights protection, as they are generally
signed between big companies and governments who are focused on the
economics, rather than the equality, of REDD. Thus, national regulations
offer indigenous groups the best chance of rights protection. Because they
are obligated to uphold human rights agreements, make laws that directly
impact indigenous peoples, and offer the greatest opportunity for
indigenous participation during the planning and design stages of REDD,
national governments can protect indigenous freedoms by creating specific
legal frameworks to uphold rights in REDD.
B. Recommendations for a Legal Framework
that Best Protects Indigenous Rights
Having argued that indigenous rights in REDD will be best protected
under national legal frameworks, Part III now offers suggestions for the
development of a pro-rights REDD regime. Reflecting on lessons learned
in Brazil’s and Indonesia’s REDD experiences, Part III.B makes
recommendations regarding forest governance, REDD financing, property
rights, and benefits distribution.
1. Financing
Both Brazil and Indonesia use hybrid mechanisms for funding. Although
Brazil’s government advocates a fund-based approach to REDD, in
actuality, Brazil’s federalist system of government uses a hybrid mix.439
The state pilot projects use market-based REDD in order to generate more
money for REDD projects, while the national government creates
international voluntary REDD funds. 440 Thus, in Brazil both methods—
fund- and market-based—are being used simultaneously. Indonesia, by
contrast, utilizes hybrid funds in a phased approach. Indonesia currently

436. See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing how indigenous rights are better protected under
sub-national and hybrid approaches because they are on a smaller scale than national
approaches).
437. See supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
438. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
439. See supra Part II.A.2.
440. See supra Part II.A.2.
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uses fund-based financing, but looks towards market-based funds in the
future. 441
The benefit of Indonesia’s version of hybrid funds is that the nation is
able to implement capacity-building programs now, to address issues of
weak forest governance. 442 This should help protect indigenous rights
throughout the REDD regime because rights issues will be taken care of
before REDD is fully implemented. While capacity building is essential to
rights protection in REDD, Brazil’s hybrid approach is ultimately stronger
than Indonesia’s. By allowing for market-based REDD at the project level,
Brazil is able to generate enough funds to implement REDD fully. 443 In
addition, by ensuring that there is a national REDD fund, supported by the
international community, Brazil is both creating a deeper pocket for its
REDD program and creating built-in rights protection. Because the REDD
fund is monitored by the international community, there likely will be more
scrutiny regarding how the funds are allocated, ensuring that there is
equitable distribution to forest-dwelling peoples.
2. Property Rights
It is essential that each nation has a clear forest tenure system in place
before implementing REDD. 444 Many countries are like Brazil and
Indonesia, with both statutory and customary land rights. To ensure that
REDD respects indigenous rights to land and resource ownership, it is
essential that the legal framework clearly addresses a dual system of rights.
While clear tenure is imperative, a specific right in forest carbon is not
necessary for a successful REDD regime. Neither Brazil nor Indonesia
recognizes a separate property right to forest carbon, and instead base their
forest carbon rights on land rights. 445 Indonesia’s indigenous communities
are not respected under REDD because their adat claims are generally not
recognized in the country. 446 In Brazil, however, customary land rights are
recognized. Indigenous groups can create reserves, on which they have
ownership rights. 447 Additionally, Brazil’s REDD benefit distributions are
not all based on land rights. 448 Thus, indigenous groups can benefit from
REDD programs even without recognized tenure.
3. Benefits Distribution
As mentioned above, both Brazil and Indonesia are experimenting with a
system wherein REDD benefits are distributed via PES systems. In
Indonesia, a weak tenure system and governmental corruption have resulted
441.
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in a bidding war between PES payments and logging companies. 449 While
some adat communities have benefitted financially from this arrangement,
the environment is not protected.450 In Brazil, payments are contingent
upon environmental services, rather than land rights. Because of this,
indigenous peoples have greater opportunity to benefit from REDD. A
highlight of Brazil’s system is that it distributes payments to both
individuals and communities, thereby promoting sustainable lifestyles on all
levels. 451
To ensure that the above safeguards are in place, there should be an
independent monitor to assess the rights situation in each nation before it
can receive REDD funding, similar to the system that currently exists under
the voluntary CCB standards. If the above recommendations are followed,
REDD can be a win-win situation for both biodiversity and the indigenous
peoples who inhabit the earth.
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